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ABSTRACT 
 
Timor-Leste is still a newly independent country, obtaining full 
independence in 2002. The new Constitution gives all citizens a right to 
education, showing how important education is for Timor-Leste. 
Educational aid has accounted for around 10% of the aid budget (and has 
been as high as 28%) over the three years from 2011 to 2014. This thesis 
explores the emerging relationship between Timor-Leste and its two largest 
aid donors: Australia and Portugal, through the lens of educational aid. 
Although there are currently some studies on Timor-Leste’s education 
policy, there is no current study which explores the relationship between 
donor foreign policy and educational aid. 
 
The thesis builds on secondary literature and interviews with important 
figures in the Timorese government. It argues that donors’ political 
priorities have had an important impact on shaping education policy in 
Timor-Leste and that the provision of educational aid can help to highlight 
Timor-Leste’s position as a highly dependent nation in the world system. 
Portuguese aid has been strongly driven by Portugal’s attempts to maintain 
political relationships with its former colonies and promote Portuguese 
language worldwide. Portuguese funding for Portuguese language education 
has had an impact on language policy, cementing the position of Portuguese 
as an official language and promoting a Portuguese-influenced position in 
Timor-Leste’s foreign policy. Australian aid, meanwhile, has emphasised 
Tetum and English as appropriate languages and is connected with 
Australian attempts to minimise Timorese discontent over oil politics in the 
Timor Gap (or Timor Sea). Coordination between these two different 
donors with different interests has been weak. Timor-Leste finds itself in a 
difficult position of dependency whereby it needs foreign aid but cannot 
trust that aid is being given in a disinterested and functional way.    
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INTRODUCTION 
  
In the past couple of decades there has been a proliferation of literature 
aimed at highlighting the problems intrinsic in donor practices. Partially in 
response to this, in recent years donor countries have put considerably more 
emphasis on educational aid in their official development assistance 
programmes (Shah & Quinn, 2014;  Winthrop & Matsui, 2013; Cassity, 
2011;  Benavot, 2010;  Browne, 2006; & Tilak, 1988)
1
. Timor-Leste, a 
relatively young country which gained its independence in 2002, has 
become a primary target for donor countries to deliver aid. Prior to its full 
independence, Timor-Leste was governed by the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) for two and half 
years from October 1999 to May 2002. During this time, Timor-Leste was 
fully assisted by the United Nations. However, after gaining its full 
independence, the new government of Timor-Leste desperately needed 
support. A helping hand from the international community throughout the 
first five years was an urgent requirement. Building a democratic nation-
state from scratch is a challenging exercise, even given the most ideal 
circumstances. Consequently, there has been much international aid flowing 
into the country, primarily from Australia and Portugal who are both 
comparatively well developed and are members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Since then, Australia 
and Portugal have been the two largest foreign aid providers to Timor-Leste, 
particularly in educational aid.  
                                                               
1 Shah, R., & Quinn, M. (2014). Mind the gap: global quality norms, national policy 
interpretations and local praxis in Timor-Leste. Compare: A Journal of 
Comparative and Development. doi:10.1080/03057925.2014.952930; Winthrop, R. 
& Matsui, E. (2013). A New Agenda for Education in Fragile States. Working Paper 
10. Center for Universal Education; Cassity, E. (2011). Australia Aid and the 
Development of Education Policy: Reframing Engagement in Papua New Guinea. In 
W. &. Jabob, Policy Debates in Comparative, International, and Development 
Education. Palgrave Macmillan; Benavot, A. (2010). International Aid to 
Education. Comparative Education Review, 54(1), 105-124; Browne, S. (2006). Aid 
and Influence: do donors help or hinder? Routledge; & Tilak, J. (1988). Foreign Aif 
for Education. International Review for Education, 34(3), 313-335. 
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From the beginning Australia and Portugal have been competing with each 
other providing aid to Timor-Leste. Educational aid has focused on primary 
schooling including teacher training, constructing and rehabilitating school 
buildings, and technical and vocational education. In 2013, Official 
Development Aid (ODA) from Timor-Leste’s development partners was 
230.9mUSD. Of this amount, Australia was the largest provider, 
contributing 31%, followed by Portugal which provided 10%. The overall 
average of ODA contributions to Timor-Leste has been approximately 
200mUSD per annum since Timor-Leste’s independence. The education 
sector was among the major recipients of total ODA, receiving 15% of the 
total (Ministerio Finansas, 2014)
2
.   
 
In recent years Australia and Portugal have both increased and expanded 
their levels of educational aid to tertiary studies in Timor-Leste. Australia 
established English studies at the National University of Timor-Leste 
(UNTL). Similarly, Portugal, through its Institute Camoes, established 
Portuguese studies at the UNTL. Australia and Portugal’s competitive 
practices have made significant changes to the Timor-Leste’s educational 
system. Both of these countries have different cultural, historical, and 
political links and models to Timor-Leste which make it difficult to predict 
the end result of their efforts. In addition, Australia and Portugal have no 
agreed education development plan between themselves and the government 
of Timor-Leste (Pires, 2014 & Shah, 2012)
3
. This less than harmonious 
relationship is believed to have impacted negatively on the quality of 
education in Timor-Leste. Recent literature on development assistance has 
suggested that at times aid can actually be detrimental to a country’s growth 
if it is not given for the right reasons or invested in the right places, 
                                                               
2 Ministerio Finansas. (2014). Development Report 2013. Dili, Ministerio Finansas Timor-
Leste. 
3 Pires, A. (2014). Interview with the Author conducted in Timor-Leste on Educational Aid 
by Australia and Portugal to Timor-Leste. (N. Correia De Almeida, Interviewer) 
Dili, Timor-Leste; & Shah, R. (2012). It Takes Two or More to Tango: Partnership 
Within the Education Sector in Timor-Leste. International Education Journal: 
Comparative Perspectives, 10(2), 71-85. 
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potentially causing growth to stagnate and cause divisions within a country 
(King, 1992)
4
. While Timor-Leste must be wary of this, the competitive 
nature of its largest donors has even further implications for the country. 
Thus, this thesis looks at how the educational aid provided by Portugal and 
Australia shapes educational policy emerging in Timor-Leste.  
 
Australia and Portugal have been the biggest donors for Timor-Leste since 
1999 and educational aid is given as part of their ODA. Education is 
important in helping citizens to create and better their futures and can bring 
major benefits to a society, not only through higher employment 
opportunities and income but also enhanced skills, improved social status 
and access to networks. Asiedu & Nandwa (2007)
5
 studied the impact of 
foreign aid in education on growth in 90 developing countries. They 
discovered that aid given in primary education has boosted growth in low-
income countries due to the fact that educational aid is often given in the 
form of grants. Although educational aid in Timor-Leste is given in the 
form of grants and the economic growth in the country, according to 
international standards, is good, that growth is not improving the lives of the 
poor and middle classes as expected. The current World Bank’s world 
development indicators reported that 49.9% of Timor-Leste’s population is 
still living under the poverty line (The World Bank, 2015)
6
, and that the 
country is not only one of the poorest countries in the Southeast Asia region 
but the whole world. Thus, where exactly the assistance provided by 
Australia and Portugal takes effect in Timor-Leste must be investigated. 
 
In order to respond to the above concerns, it is important to assess studies 
                                                               
4 King, K. (1992). The External Agenda of Aid in Internal Educational Reform. 
International Journal of Education Development, 12(4), 257-263. 
5 Asiedu, E & Nandwa, B. (2007). On the Impact of Foreign Aid in Education on Growth: 
How Relevant is the Heterogeneity of Aid Flows and the Heterogeneity of Aid 
Recipients? Review of the World Economics, 143(4), 631-649. 
6 The World Bank. (n.d.). Timor-Leste: World Development Indicators. Retrieved February 
15, 2015, from The World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste.  
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on foreign aid or development aid in general and particularly how it affects 
both donors and recipients. In various studies, Shah & Quinn, (2014)
7
,  Shah 
(2012)
8
, Riddell (2007)
9
, Lancaster (2007)
10
, Hudson (2004)
11
; and King 
(1992)
12
 for example, among others, have argued that aid practices matter 
because on the one hand some donor countries want recipients to reform 
their internal sectors based on donor wishes. On the other hand, some 
indicators suggested that ODA has contributed to the recipient countries’ 
development progress through imparting skills and providing for 
improvement and development in physical infrastructure and health and 
education sectors (Riddell, 2012
13
 & Riddel, 2007
14
). In fact, education in 
Timor-Leste is still facing challenges. If one can assume that both Australia 
and Portugal have their own agenda in delivering educational aid, then what 
are the effects of this on Timor-Leste? Is Timor-Leste’s quality of education 
really improving? To whose standards is education being delivered and is 
this congruent to Timor-Leste’s culture and context? These questions are 
important because how aid is delivered greatly affects whether or not it 
improves or hinders a country’s growth. This thesis seeks to replicate 
existing studies by King (1992)
15
 and others to analyse how Australia and 
Portugal’s educational aid influences policy-making in Timor-Leste.   
 
 
 
                                                               
7 Shah, R., & Quinn, M. (2014). Mind the gap: global quality norms, national policy 
interpretations and local praxis in Timor-Leste. Compare: A Journal of 
Comparative and. doi:10.1080/03057925.2014.952930. 
8 Shah, R. (2012.  
9 Riddell, R. (2007). Does Foreign Aid Really Work? . Oxford University Press. 
10 Lancaster, C. (2007). Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. 
University of Chicago Press. 
11 Hudson, J. (2004). Introduction: Aid and Development . The Economic Journal, 
114(496), F185-F190. 
12 King, K. (1992).  
13
 Riddell, A. (2012). The Effectiveness of Foreign Aid to Education: What Can be 
Learned? WIDER Working Paper. 
14
 Riddell, R. (2007).  
15 King, K. (1992). 
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Methodology 
 
The choice of this research topic arises out of the author’s observations of 
the rebuilding of Timor-Leste as a new nation since its independence from 
occupying Indonesia. Timor-Leste is a relatively new country with weak 
economic capacity and institutions. Therefore it needs high levels of aid in 
order to help rebuild and develop from scratch. In addition, there is 
currently little research looking at Australian and Portuguese educational 
aid to Timor-Leste. Previous studies which have addressed aid flows in the 
country have often been too narrow in their scope, written for specific 
policy purposes and failing to give a comprehensive analysis of all issues at 
hand. Thus, Timor-Leste is a traditional example of a post-conflict, fragile 
state attempting to rapidly restore its shattered education system. However, 
once donor interest wanes this young nation will struggle to properly deliver 
services. This thesis seeks to close this gap by undertaking a more in-depth 
and comprehensive analysis of the impacts of Australia and Portugal’s 
educational assistance to Timor-Leste education policy.  
 
This research uses primary and secondary data sources as a legal basis. The 
primary data derives from semi-structured interviews with several policy 
makers and national stakeholders in Timor-Leste including the Ministry of 
Education (MoE) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 
(MFAC). In addition, the author had also attended Timor-Leste’s 
Development Partners Meeting (TLDPM) in Dili
16
, Timor-Leste on 25-26 
July 2014. The interviews were also conducted with International donor 
partners including the Portuguese and Australian Embassies in Dili. The 
secondary data is derived from reviewing various literature on aid, 
educational aid and neo-colonialism, and examining various government 
document reports and surveys related to aid and educational aid to Timor-
Leste. Generally, the author has attempted to develop the limited amount of 
secondary data literature available to complete this research.  
                                                               
16 Dili is the capital city of Timor-Leste.  
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Secondary literature was used to form an impression of the context and the 
historical overview of educational aid to Timor-Leste, particularly to gain 
more understanding into Australian and Portuguese educational aid to 
Timor-Leste. Broader secondary literature on educational aid to other 
countries, such as African and Pacific Island nations, was also consulted as 
comparison. Finally, during an interview with Antoninho Pires – the current 
General Director of the Ministry of Education of Timor-Leste – an 
important book, As Bases Legais Do Sistema Da Educação De Timor-Leste 
(Legal Basis for Education System in Timor-Leste) was obtained and 
permitted to be used. During an interview with Vanessa Spencer, 
Cooperation Officer of the Portuguese Embassy in Dili, another important 
document, “Strategic Programmes on Cooperation between Portugal and 
Timor-Leste 2014-2017” was obtained and permission granted for its use in 
this thesis. 
 
Interviews were conducted with four different groups of people including 
national stakeholders and donor partners in Timor-Leste. They were 
Antoninho Pires from the MoE, and Armindo Pedro Simoes, the National 
Director of Multilateral Cooperation at the MFAC. Additionally, two 
officials from the aid agencies that are the focus of this research were also 
interviewed; these were Debbie Wong, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) of Australia at the Australian Embassy in Dili and Vanessa 
Spencer of the Portuguese Embassy. Also, the Head of Dili International 
School (DIS) was interviewed, and, as background, some NGO workers 
involved in education policy. The information gathered from the interviews 
was used as background information given the limited amount of literature 
available. Questions were asked to each participant based on the area of 
their expertise. These interviews attempted to cover educational aid to 
Timor-Leste and how it affects the education policy of Timor-Leste.  
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Literature Review 
 
In recent years there has been an immense expansion on aid literature 
written by advocates, critics, practitioners and academics alike who seek to 
critique and improve on development practices. What exactly is 
development aid or foreign aid, as we know it today? The OECD, for 
example, argues foreign aid is “the transfer of capital, goods, or services 
from one country to another. Foreign aid may be given in the form of capital 
transfers or technical assistance and training for either civilian or military 
purposes” (OECD, n.d)17. In addition, Lancaster (2007)18 defined foreign 
aid as “a gift of public resources from one country to another… with 
purpose to improve human condition in the countries receiving the aid” 
(p.1). Moreover, Riddell (2007)
19
 in his book Does Foreign Aid Really 
Work? broadly explained that foreign aid “consists of all resources – 
physical goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants (gifts), or 
loans (concessional rates) – transferred by donors to recipients” (p.17). 
Riddell acknowledged that the above definition has not satisfied the whole 
world, because a lot of questions need to be answered. For example, Riddell 
referred to development assistance or development aid to describe foreign 
aid.  
 
Donors have made specific commitments, such as those contained in the 
‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’, to ensure that development 
assistance is offered with no strings attached and strongly informed by the 
real desires and assessed needs of the intended beneficiary states and their 
citizens (OECD, 2005)
20
. Timor-Leste, a post conflict country, has been a 
                                                               
17 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation Development. (n.d.). Official 
Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage. Retrieved February 10, 2015, 
from OECD Home: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.
htm.  
18 Lancaster, C. (2007). 
19 Riddell, R. (2007). 
20 OECD. (2005). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. OECD.  
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strong advocate for the Paris Declaration. However, Browne (2006)
21
 
claimed that aid providers influence recipient countries based on donors’ 
demands. Browne examined the policies of the IMF and Wold Bank and 
how these changed over time. Brown found that there were several instances 
of bilateral donors providing aid, but with particular constraints on recipient 
countries based on their specific agendas and interests of the donors. Such 
findings can be dated back to Little & Clifford (1966)
22
 who argued that 
foreign aid increases rather than reduces poverty in developing countries 
primarily benefitting the political elites of the recipients and the donors’ 
interests rather than the people. Furthermore, donor countries have 
implemented their aid programmes in such a way that they maximise the 
economic benefits of their own states and citizens. 
 
King (1992)
23
 specifically analyses educational aid practices in primarily 
Sub-Saharan African countries and found out that most donor countries 
want recipient countries to reform their internal education sectors based on 
their own wishes. Donor countries potentially attempt to reform recipient 
countries in their image to justify their expenditure. King further claimed 
that aid programmes implemented in the Sub-Saharan African region have 
often failed to meet the goals recipient countries wanted and as a result the 
positive impact of educational aid has been minimal. Therefore, King 
suggested that the implementation of educational aid should be sustainable, 
locally owned and executed, as well as supportive of good policies in not 
only the education sector but all sectors of recipient countries. In reality, 
King (1992)
24
 confirmed that donor aid providers disregarded this best 
practice. Donors wanted the developing countries to support their projects, 
not to impose their national policy into their programmes. In addition, 
educational aid providers often concerned with time pursued a target 
deadline at the expense of quality. It can also be argued that donor aid 
                                                               
21 Browne, S. (2006). Aid and Influence: do donors help or hinder? Routledge. 
22 Little, I.M.D., & Clifford, J.M. (1966). International Aid. The Flow of Public Resources 
From Rich to Poor Countries. New Jersey, USA: Transaction Publishers. 
23 King, K. (1992). 
24 Ibid 
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providers do not genuinely provide capacity building as expected. King 
(1992)
25
 recommended that in order for education to be effective and 
successful, educational aid providers should be concerned and in line with 
national policy about the priorities of recipient countries. Most importantly 
King argued that education policy needed to be locally-owned from the 
planning phase to the implementation of projects to ensure its congruence 
and maximum impact. 
 
Closer to Timor-Leste, Le Fanu (2013)
26
 in his research on international 
education aid in Papua New Guinea (PNG) indicated that the PNG 
curriculum has been designed by various influences, most especially 
Western educational ideology particularly Australian and American’s 
system. This was partly because PNG’s education policy was designed by 
technical assistants provided by the international development community. 
Le Fanu pointed out that foreign countries tried to use PNG as an 
experimental state. International consultants wrote proposals and 
hypotheses, which PNG, trusting their expertise, would buy. This was 
perhaps as Altbach (1971)
27
 indicated in his note that modern 
neocolonialism in developing countries has not involved direct political 
control from the dominant countries. However, a few aspects of mastership 
are still maintained by developed nations over their former colonies. Mostly 
developing countries’ education systems in almost all levels are deeply-
rooted in the administrative structures of the former colonial rulers. 
Moreover, these countries tend to use their former colonial language as the 
medium of instruction in their education systems and administration 
services. Therefore, the former colonial powers provide foreign aid and 
technical assistance in helping design curriculums, or else provide physical 
facilities and other educational materials, which are not necessarily in line 
                                                               
25 King, K. (1992). 
26 Le Fanu, G. (2013). The Inclusion of Inclusive Education in International Development: 
Lessons from Papua New Guinea. International Journal of Educational 
Development , 33(2), 139-148. 
27 Altbach, P. (1971). Educational and Neocolonialism: A Note. Comparative Education 
Review, 15(2), 237-239. doi:10.2307/1186733. 
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with what might be best for the country at hand. Hence, Altbach (1971)
28
 
argued that “neocolonialism is to designate the continued post-colonial 
impact of the advanced industrial countries on the educational systems and 
policies as well as the intellectual life of developing areas” (p.237)29.  
 
Furthermore, a study by Brock-Utne (1995)
30
 for example, revealed that in 
the early 1960s, when most of the African states gained their independence 
from their European colonial masters, the African leaders initiated a 
gathering to establish a good, communal education system for their newly-
formed African nations. Even though the discussion took place on the 
African continent, Brock-Utne noted, the conference still resulted in the 
African education system being constructed in line with the Western 
educational style. This was due to a lack in African leaders and policy-
makers in expertise on education policy approaches. Hence, the Africans did 
not benefit much from the Europeans’ assistance. Dating back to the late 
1980s, an African origin writer, Thiong’o (1986) 31 , in his book, 
Decolonizing the Mind, pointed out that although the conquest or 
colonization physically has ended, the colonization of the mind, spirit, and 
culture are still ongoing. The colonization of the mind is the main weapon 
of Western nations to ensure other nations, especially those in the third 
world, remain subject to the colonizing powers, manifested in another form. 
The modern neo-colonialism is embedded in various fields, including in the 
education system. The modern colonisation in the field of the mind and 
spirit has been introduced in the process of education.  
 
Timor-Leste is a post-colonial country and gets relatively high levels of 
development aid, but from whom, for what and why? The long struggle for 
independence from Indonesian occupation and the previous Portuguese 
                                                               
28 Altbach, P. (1971). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Brock-Utne, B. (1995). Cultural Conditionality and Aid to Education in East Africa. 
International Review of Education, 41(3-4), 177-197. 
31 Thiong'O, N. W. (1986). Decolonizing the Mind: the Politics of Language in African 
Literature. London: James Currey. 
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colonization destroyed the fabric of the country and governance institutions. 
The suppression of citizens has produced a post-conflict state where a lot 
needs to be done in terms of nation-building to bring it to a modern 
functional level. This condition has attracted the attention of Australia and 
Portugal, both keen to help alleviate the suffering of the population of 
Timor-Leste in the form of foreign aid. Australia and Portugal are the two 
biggest donors but both have quite different historical relationships with 
Timor-Leste which could further impact their foreign aid policy in the 
country.  
 
The study of educational aid practices are important as demonstrated by Le 
Fanu (2013)
32
, Shah (2012)
33
, Anderson (2010)
34
, Asiedu & Nandwa 
(2007)
35
, The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2002, 2007)
36
, King (1992)
37
, 
Thiong’o (1986)38; Altbach (1971) 39, & Little & Clifford (1966)40 who have 
all argued that educational aid can cause more problems for a country than it 
resolves. These ideas on educational aid and in relation to Timor-Leste’s 
context raise a number of questions. To address these issues and potential 
problems, this research seeks to analyse how donor influence shapes the 
educational policy recently emerging in Timor-Leste. I am not suggesting 
that all the problems with Timor-Leste’s education sector are due to donor 
influences. There are of course also issues with the quality of the Timor-
Leste’s governmental public sector, including corruption. However, the 
focus of this study is the politics of relationships with donors. This analysis 
is based on the above literature review and other data and surveys.   
 
                                                               
32 Le Fanu, G. (2013). 
33 Shah, R. (2012). 
34 Anderson, T. (2010). Timor-Leste: the second Australian intervention. Journal of 
Australian political economy, 58(December), 62-93. 
35Asiedu, E & Nandwa, B. (2007). 
36 The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2002). Analyzing Australian Assistance to East Timor. Dili, 
Timor-Leste: The Lao Hamutuk; The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2007). Australia Aid 
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Chapter Overview 
 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter provides an 
overview of educational aid in Timor-Leste. As a new and young country 
Timor-Leste is seeking to guarantee its citizens a decent education, after 
liberation from a long period of colonization and a short time of illegal 
occupation. These countless challenges forced the country’s leaders to look 
for help from external donors. This chapter examines the impact of these 
external donors’ policies on the education system in Timor-Leste, especially 
educational aid from Australia and Portugal. Educational aid is part of the 
ODA, and Australia and Portugal have been the key contributors to 
education sector in Timor-Leste. Prior to 2006, Timor-Leste’s educational 
sector heavily relied on external donors. This might explain why 
educational aid from external donors is not working in Timor-Leste. Also, it 
focuses on the donor interests and agendas and considers the lack of 
coordination that leads to a lack of improvement in the quality of education 
in Timor-Leste. Educational aid is always political and it is difficult for 
recipients that are small dependent nations like Timor-Leste to negotiate 
with donors.  
 
The second chapter discusses Portuguese educational aid and the politics of 
the Portuguese language in Timor-Leste. It starts with an overview of 
Portuguese foreign policy to Timor-Leste. Portuguese foreign policy is 
designed to promote and protect the Portuguese language and culture 
throughout the world including Timor-Leste. It presents a number of 
bilateral cooperation agreements signed by both governments. This chapter 
mainly examines the reasons that Timor-Leste chose Portuguese as one of 
its official languages, and why some people disagreed with the language 
policy. It further explains the advantages and disadvantages in adopting 
Portuguese language among Timor-Leste’s official languages. It 
underscores that Timor-Leste is in desperate need of the amount of 
Portuguese aid provided. Thus, Portuguese aid plays an important role in 
 13 
 
influencing the Timorese political elites by pushing its agenda towards 
Portuguese language.  
 
Chapter three discusses the Australian educational aid to Timor-Leste. It 
starts with the explanation of Australia’s foreign policy to Timor-Leste. The 
chapter further emphasises Australian aid to Timor-Leste focused on 
humanitarian and development assistance, however, like other donor 
countries its foreign policy interest is also applied. Australian aid aims for 
political stability and to promote Australia’s oil interests in Timor-Leste. 
The Australian aid relationship with Timor-Leste is designed to maintain 
and secure Australian interest. In short, Australian aid involvement in 
education is clearly designed to encourage Timorese government officials to 
look at Australia as a friend. In other words, Australia has spent a lot of 
money in Timor-Leste to buy friendship with Timorese to secure its national 
interests. 
 
Finally, this research will provide some concluding remarks and underline 
potential ways forward for the government of Timor-Leste in controlling 
and reducing its dependency on foreign educational aid. The concluding 
chapter discusses findings on how Australia and Portugal have been 
involved in educational assistance in the form of money and technical 
assistances. Several problems are identified, but mainly discussion focuses 
on whether technical assistance is appropriate and the political disagreement 
between the two big donors. In short, no donors are trustworthy, but Timor-
Leste needs assistance. If Timor-Leste’s human resources are improved, the 
government can have confidence that it will not depend on donors in the 
future. The government is working to control and coordinate the donor 
partners through several means, such as TLDPM, SDP 2011-2030, and the 
internal policy of the MoE to ensure aid has a more positive impact in line 
with national priorities.  
 
 
 
 14 
 
CHAPTER ONE: Overview of Educational Aid in Timor-Leste  
 
Every citizen has an equal right to receive a proper education. This 
statement is well known globally and all governments around the world 
have been driven to accomplish it. The initiating notion of the Education for 
All (EFA) and Universal Primary Education (UPE) was welcomed by those 
in international development aid as a directive to facilitate the access of 
students all over the world, particularly in poor countries, to education 
(World Bank, 2014; D’Aiglepierre & Wagner, 2013; Turrent & Oketch, 
2009)
41
. Furthermore D’Aiglepierre & Wagner (2013) 42  noted that the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) related to education, particularly 
the goal of achieving universal primary education, ought to be considered as 
a main priority for an international community keen to provide educational 
aid to developing countries. As a young country Timor-Leste has taken the 
right to universal education into consideration and guarantees its citizens a 
decent education. The seriousness with which the government takes this 
goal is embedded in the state’s constitution. Under article 59 of the 
Constitution of Timor-Leste “the state shall recognise and guarantee that 
every citizen has the right to education… and vocational training” 
(Assembly Constituent, 2002. pp.27-28)
43
. It is argued that the government 
was given authority by the constitution to establish a universal basic public 
education as compulsory and free of charge. The article contains provisions 
to the rights of the Timorese to a quality education. In order to enforce the 
law, in recent years, the government has introduced regulations to the 
education sector including a Basic Law on Education, promulgated in 2008, 
and an Organic Law of the Ministry of Education. These laws and policies 
                                                               
41 World Bank. (2014). Education. Retrieved from Education For All: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/education/brief/education-for-all; 
D’Aiglepierre, R., & Wagner, L. (2013). Aid and universal primary education. 
Economics of Education Review, 37, 95-112; & Turrent, V., & Oketch, M. (2009). 
Financing Universal Primary Education: An Analysis of Official Development 
Assistance in Fragile States. International Journal of Educational Development, 
29(4), 357-365. 
42 D’Aiglepierre, R., & Wagner, L. (2013). 
43 Assembly Constituent. (2002). Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 
Dili: Assembly Constituent.  
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provide for a regulatory framework of the education system in Timor-Leste 
(Ministerio Da Educacao, 2012)
44
. These regulations are good on paper, but 
putting them into practice is another question. One of the biggest challenges 
faced by Timor-Leste, post-2002 independence, was how and where to 
source the funds necessary to finance the country’s education development. 
 
Post-conflict situations are well recognised to be periods when countries 
encounter significant challenges on the path to development. Since 
independence, human resource development in Timor-Leste has been slow, 
far from meeting most of the millennium goals targets. Timor-Leste now 
suffers from a narrow economic and private-sector base, infrastructure 
deficit, frequent food insecurity, and poor quality education. Thus, it needs 
the public sector to lead in building institutions, establishing relevant legal 
frameworks, and building service delivery mechanisms to ensure the 
development of its human resources and citizenry generally. Furthermore, 
during occupation, life was tough and the quality of education was poor as 
Timorese attention was often divided between wider national issues and 
attendance to the substandard education provided by the occupiers. Social 
and governance structures in the country were destroyed and hence failed to 
exercise control over the people, and skilled and knowledgeable people 
disappeared either involuntarily or through the brain drain of the country.  
Those concerns need to be addressed. Subsequently, at the declaration of 
independence, the Timorese responded to the call to start rebuilding the 
nation and participated in the efforts of the first UNTAET, (Shah & Quinn, 
2014; Shah, 2012; & Manor, 2007)
45
. Throughout the UN transition from 
October 1999 to May 2002, the education sector in Timor-Leste was 
completely facilitated and supported by international donors, especially 
Australia and Portugal, which continued even after independence in 2002 to 
late 2006.  For example, in early 2000, the UN had tried to save the 
                                                               
44 Ministerio Da Educacao. (2012). As Bases Legais Do Sistema Da Educacao De Timor-
Leste. Dili, Timor-Leste: Ministerio Da Educacao, Timor-Leste. 
45 Shah, R., & Quinn, M. (2014); Shah, R. (2012); & Manor, J. (2007).  
 16 
 
education sector in Timor-Leste by recruiting a few elementary school 
teachers although arguably these measures ultimately failed (Shah, 2012)
46
.  
 
Antoninho Pires, the current General Director of the MoE, throughout his 
interview in Timor-Leste, opined that from the period of 1999 to 2006 
donor countries that provided educational aid to Timor-Leste were working 
on their own. The government was often not informed by donors until the 
projects were completed. As a result it was hard to control their activities 
and financial support prior to 2010. It was partly because of the 
establishment of the new government that all institutions started from 
scratch, hence, the lack of human resources, particularly in respect of 
inexperienced officials and civil servants in the education sector (Pires, 
2014)
47
. In addition, at the time of Timor-Leste’s independence, most 
schools had been destroyed and there was also a lack of primary school 
teachers. When Timor-Leste succeeded in separating from Indonesia in 
September 1999, the Indonesian military and its militias carried out mass 
destruction and mass murder throughout the whole country. It resulted in the 
massive devastation of infrastructure, and paralyzed all government 
institutions. There were immediate challenges in reconstructing essential 
infrastructure, to ensure children could get to a school, along with the 
recruitment and training of teachers and other education professionals. 
While this situation derived from being a newly independent state, Timor-
Leste desperately needed the help of the international community. 
Eventually, a significant amount of international assistance flowed into the 
country. Australia and Portugal acted immediately in responding to the 
Timor-Leste’s distress by providing aid. Since then, Australia and Portugal, 
with Japan, have been the largest providers of aid to Timor-Leste.  
 
                                                               
46
 Shah, R. (2012). 
47
 Pires, A.  (2014). Interview.  
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Numerous research, reports and government documents conducted by the 
donor countries, researchers, and international and national NGOs, stressed 
that aid for education to Timor-Leste to date has encompassed a large 
expenditure of funds (Australian Government, DFAT, 2015; Anderson, 
2010; Deutsch, 2009, & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)
48
. On one hand, 
government officials of Timor-Leste, donor partners and a few individuals 
have recognised that the ODA, especially educational aid to Timor-Leste, 
has brought a positive impact and played a significant change in Timor-
Leste’s education sector. For example, educational aid has been used to 
rehabilitate school buildings, provide facilities and expertise, and design 
curricula for primary schools. On the other hand, these reports and findings 
highlight concerns that the quality of education in Timor-Leste, since its 
independence, have not met the expected standards. What is actually 
wrong? Are the causes to be found with the government of Timor-Leste or 
with the donor countries? The following sections explain what is essentially 
happening with educational aid in Timor-Leste.  
 
The Impact of Educational Aid  
 
Educational aid is part of the ODA to Timor-Leste, and the ODA has played 
a significant role in the development of Timor-Leste from the time of 
independence, especially to the education sector. The education system of 
Timor-Leste has developed, both in terms of the curriculum for basic 
education and infrastructure. Hence, the government has been working hard 
to develop national prosperity and guarantees all its citizens the right to 
education, with the help of donor partners. As a result, Timor-Leste has 
                                                               
48 Australian Government-DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade). (2015). Aid: 
Development Assistance in Timor-Leste. Retrieved from 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/development-assistance/Pages/education-
assistance-timor-leste.aspx; Anderson, T. (2010); Deutsch, A. (2009). Billions in 
International Aid for East Timor Missing its Target. Retrieved from Los Angeles 
Times: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/13/news/adfg-east-timor-money1; & The 
Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2002).  
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received over a billion dollars in ODA (Ministeriu Finansas 2014)
49
. The 
average annual amount of ODA funding to Timor-Leste has remained more 
than 200mUSD per annum in recent years. In the past five years ODA alone 
has accounted for nearly 15% of the total state budget. The MoE receives 
6.8% of the overall off-budget grant of the total ODA. More specifically, 
the MoE obtained 12.6mUSD in 2014 in off-budget grants of the ODA from 
different Donor Partners (DP) (MoF, 2014)
50
. These funds support a variety 
of initiatives including scholarships, primary and secondary education and 
capacity building. The total amount of educational aid received from DPs 
between 2011 and 2014 was more than 227mUSD (MoF, 2014b)
51
. The 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) has created an Aid Transparency Portal (ATP)
 52
 
in collaboration with DPs to trace donors’ support to Timor-Leste. 
However, the portal is in the process of capturing historical information 
prior to 2010, thus disbursement data may be larger than current 
commitment data. Pires (2014)
53
 and Nicolai, (2004)
54
 claimed that the 
budget for Timor-Leste’s education, post-referendum from 1999 to 2002 
and after independence from 2002 to 2006, relied heavily on external funds. 
Pires (2014)
55
 admitted that there is currently not enough data to be used as 
a complete source of reference. 
 
The Portuguese and Australian contributions were in the form of 
constructing school buildings and facilities, and providing teachers, 
curriculum designers and other educator expertise. It is undeniable that 
                                                               
49
 Ministerio Finansas. (2014). 
50
 MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2014). State Budget 2014, Development Partners: Book 5. 
Dili: Ministry of Finance, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 
51  MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2014b). Aid Portal Transparency. Retrieved from 
www.aidtransparency.gov.tl.  
52
The government of Timor-Leste created ATP to oversee aid management and 
coordination. The introduction of the ATP, which is the central repository for all aid 
information in Timor-Leste, aims in a transparent way to improve accuracy and 
predictability in aid reporting and to ensure assistance provided is efficient and 
effective. Development Partners are responsible for providing all data directly into 
the Aid Transparency Portal system.  
53
 Pires, A. (2014). Interview.  
54 Nicolai, S. (2004). Rebuilding Timor-Leste’s Education System. International Institute 
for Education. 
55
 Pires, A. (2014). Interview. 
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since the independence of Timor-Leste, the development in the education 
sector has gradually started to improve with the support of a number of 
donor development partners. Timor-Leste currently receives educational aid 
from the five largest donors: DFAT-Australia Aid Programme (formerly 
AUSAID), Portugal-Camoes Instituto Da Cooperacao E Da Lingua 
(formerly IPAD), United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the World Bank, and Korean Institutional Cooperation Agency 
(MoF, 2014)
56
. 
 
In order to oversee aid management and coordination, the government of 
Timor-Leste established the Development Partnership Management Unit 
under the MoF. As a result, since December 2002, the government of 
Timor-Leste has been conducting annual meetings with all external DPs. 
The Timor-Leste Development Partner Meeting (TLDPM) is an annual 
conference attended by the Government of Timor-Leste and DPs operating 
in Timor-Leste. The meeting has been considered by the government as an 
opportunity to review previous development successes and challenges, and 
consider ways to strengthen and align future development initiatives. The 
TLDPM draws strongly upon the belief enshrined in the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness that the building of more effective and inclusive 
partnerships between government and development partners will have a 
greater impact on reducing poverty and, therefore, ensure a more positive 
future for the people of Timor-Leste. TLDPM has sought to highlight the 
significance of forging development partnerships among bilateral and 
multilateral donors and other key development stakeholders, including civil 
society, operating in the country.  
 
The government of Timor-Leste acknowledged that educational assistance 
from external donors has been used and helped the development of 
                                                               
56 MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2014). 
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education in Timor-Leste. Hundreds of primary and secondary school 
buildings have been built and equipped with materials and hundreds of 
Timorese have been recruited and trained to be Portuguese teachers, even 
though, the quality of these teachers is still poor (Shah, 2012)
57
. In fact, the 
results of the development itself have not satisfied the majority of Timorese 
people. Unsurprisingly therefore, in the long term, Timor-Leste’s education 
outlook will be affected greatly by its relationship with its two biggest 
donors Australia and Portugal.  
 
Why is Educational Aid Not Working?  
 
“Nothing is free”; perhaps this phrase should be understood by Timorese 
when receiving too much foreign aid from the beginning. The more money 
and aid Timor-Leste takes from Australia and Portugal, the more dependent 
on them Timor-Leste will be. This fact is not much different from what had 
been expressed by Sunkel’s definition (1969. P.23, in Ferraro, 1996)58 of 
dependency as “an explanation of the economic development of a state in 
terms of the external influences on political, economic, and cultural on the 
national development policies”. Ferraro (1996) further concluded in his 
Dependency Theory: An Introduction that the external forces included 
multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign 
assistance, communications, and any other means by which the advanced 
industrialised countries can represent their economic interest abroad” 
(p.2)
59
. In spite of the huge educational assistance by Australia and Portugal 
for more than a decade, the quality of education in Timor-Leste still does 
not meet acceptable standards (Timor-Leste NGO Forum, 2014; Shah, 
2012; & Anderson, 2010)
 60
. Educational aid particularly was not a major 
                                                               
57 Shah, R. (2012).  
58 Ferraro, V. (1996). Dependency Theory: An Introduction. The Development Economics 
Reader, ed. Giorgio Secondi (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 58-64. 
59
 Ibid.  
60 Timor-Leste NGO Forum. (2014). Presentation on Economic Strategic Sector. 2014 
Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting. Dili: Timor-Leste NGO Forum 
Document obtained during the TLDPM; Shah, R. (2012); Anderson, T. (2010). 
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discussion under the TLDPM held in Dili, July 2014. When the education 
sector was discussed, one of the biggest concerns from civil society and 
donor partners during the meeting was the continuation of poor quality 
education in Timor-Leste. The civil society representative and donor 
partners as well as the government recognised that continued poor education 
was due to a lack of coordination between donors and government and civil 
society. Moreover, the poor quality of education confirmed by numerous 
reports and research from national and international NGOs and individuals 
all found that the quality of education in Timor-Leste continued to be poor 
despite the large support of international donors.  
 
Recent research conducted by Shah (2012)
61
 analysed in depth the impacts 
and dynamics of such cooperation between and amongst the educational aid 
providers and the state and the civil societies of the basic education sector in 
Timor-Leste. In his research paper It Takes Two or More to Tango: 
Partnerships within the Education Sector in Timor-Leste, Shah found 
international donors’ commitment to the significance of partnerships 
between donors and the state and civil society ineffective because donor 
providers failed to consider Timor-Leste as a fragile state with high levels of 
distrust between and amongst the donor providers, the state, civil society 
and the MoE. Furthermore, Shah also explained that the practices of 
uncontrolled aid flows became common and frequently occurred due to the 
inability and inexperience of state institutions. Shah (2012)
62
 focused on the 
dynamics of such cooperation in Timor-Leste’s basic education sector, 
particularly on how the state, donors and service providers that have 
evolved in their partnership arrangements provide in-service training to the 
large numbers of the country’s primary school teachers, though under or 
                                                               
61
 Shah, R. (2012); Dr. Ritesh A. Shah is a Professor and Researcher at the University of 
Auckland, New Zealand.  Dr. Shah spent approximately four years at the Ministry of 
Education of Timor-Leste as an advisor for designing the curriculum of the country. 
Dr. Shah’s assessment based on his doctoral research focuses on documenting and 
analyzing Timorese primary teachers’ strategic responses to reforms to the 
curriculum following the country’s recent independence.  
62
Shah, R. (2012). 
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unqualified. Shah emphasised the tensions involved in moving towards 
coordinated activity in fragile states, particularly from the donor 
perspective.  
 
In early 2000 in order to save and preserve the continuation of the learning 
process in Timor-Leste after separating from Indonesian occupation, Timor-
Leste’s transitional government recruited numbers of primary school 
teachers. In general, however, the majority of these teachers are not 
qualified to teach (Shah, 2012)
63
. Portugal was the most significant player in 
the realm of teacher training due to its “comparative language advantage” in 
meeting the demands of early governments to focus initial teacher training 
on the reintroduction of Portuguese into the classroom. Shah (2012)
64
 
assessed a series of reports on Timor-Leste’s educational system in 2004 to 
2005 and found that the ‘access first, quality later’ approach taken by 
UNTAET and the Timorese government, as well as donors, had led to a 
number of longer-term problems, in particular high student attrition rates, 
and poor student achievement. He reported that the Instituto Para Formação 
Continuada (INFCP) has been the main service provider of in-service 
training since 2004 within the MoE but the staff were mainly foreign 
technical advisors with no clear guidance and an inappropriate mandate. As 
a result, in 2008, Shah found from a number of donor reports that the in-
service training provision was largely provided through donors such as 
Portugal, Brazil and UNICEF, alongside a number of smaller NGOs. In-
service training provision thus became plagued by fragmentation, 
duplication of efforts, poor coordination, and poor systems of monitoring 
and accountability, leading to inefficient use of both teachers’ time and the 
resources poured into such programmes. In his interview with senior 
officials from INFCP, Shah (2012)
65
 found that training providers (donors) 
had their own agendas, while the lack of coordination and the lack of 
                                                               
63 Shah, R. (2012). 
64 Ibid. 
65
 Shah, R. (2012).  
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sensitivity to Timorese cultures led to the programme’s failure. The 
Portugal Cooperation representative has also admitted that “One day the 
teachers would be trained by Portugal, the next by another organization like 
UNICEF and the next day with PROFEP
66, and the next with an NGO… 
there were just too many people sending different messages to these 
teachers” (p.76)67. 
 
Shah (2012)
68
 discovered that the IPAD – the previous Portuguese 
Cooperation (currently converted in Instituto de Camoes) – was acting as a 
donor as well as the state. This situation also applies to some NGOs and 
other donor providers such as UNICEF and the Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC). For example in 2010, NRC implemented its Compact Teacher 
Training Programme to the primary teachers in 30 schools. In developing 
the pilot project, the NRC controlled all aspects of the project without 
involving any staff from the Ministry of Education. Shah finally claimed 
that educational aid from donors to Timor-Leste had failed due to a lack in 
coordination, and often time donors implemented their programmes based 
on what they wanted instead of what the government of Timor-Leste 
needed.  
 
The previous fifth constitutional government of Timor-Leste, elected to 
power in 2012 and due to hold office until 2017, has firmly affirmed its 
policy towards international DPs. The government has learned from past 
experience that the role of government failure in coordinating education 
policy formulation and implementation led to the poor quality of education. 
The dramatic structural changes to be made in the sixth constitution of 
government and due to hold office from February 2015 to 2017, shows the 
                                                               
66
 PROFEB (Portuguese) stands for Formação de Professores em Exercício na Escola 
Primária em Timor-Leste (Teacher Training in Exercise Primary School in Timor-
Leste). Cooperation between Timor-Leste and Brazil.  
67 Shah, R. (2012).  
68 Ibid. 
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government of Timor-Leste’s commitment to improving its internal affairs. 
It is mandatory for all foreign aid providers or DPs to deliver their aid 
through official government channels. For example, development aid related 
to education needs to be discussed and agreed by the MoE prior to the 
programmes’ implementation. Hence, the government can easily control the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the aid as addressed clearly in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The government has begun to address 
these issues as part of its efforts to foster a consensus among donors on how 
to work more strategically on the integration between donor partners and the 
government. The TLDPM was created to respond to this. DPs need to 
comply with the national priorities of Timor-Leste and the Strategic 
Development Plan (SDP) 2011-2030. The SDP 2011-2030 is the 
overarching framework for the DPs’ project and programmes design and 
implementation and re-affirms the alignment of their work with Timor-
Leste’s strategy plans and targets (Pires, 2014 & MoF, 2014)69. 
 
The Paris Declaration commits donors and partners to being accountable to 
each other in the achievement of development results. Pires (2014)
70
 
described that in terms of financial support, Australia has been the largest 
donor to the education sector in Timor-Leste, while Portugal has been the 
largest donor to the education sector in Timor-Leste in terms of activities 
and other technical supports, for example, hundreds of Portuguese teachers 
have been deployed in Timor-Leste by the Portuguese government. From 
the period of 1999 to 2006, the Timor-Leste government did not control the 
education process, it was in the hands of donors. For example, the 
introduction of the Portuguese language to Timorese schools was managed 
by the Portuguese aid agency. Additionally, at the same time, Australia 
supported the rehabilitation of school buildings to facilitate the access of 
Timorese children to school. This was problematic for the new government 
who lacked the expertise to supervise or provide direction. Consequently the 
                                                               
69 Pires, A. (2014); & MoF (Ministry of Finance). 2014). 
70 Pires, A. (2014). 
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donors who had helped in the early stages of independence were unable to 
be controlled by the government of Timor-Leste and results became hard to 
predict (Pires, 2014)
71
. The years from 2006 to 2008 were considered a 
transitional period. It was marked by a significant change in the ownership 
programme. The government of Timor-Leste started to support the 
education sector by contributing 30% with the other 70% provided by the 
DPs. And by the end of 2010, the government of Timor-Leste had managed 
to gain more control including the management of DPs’ activity. The 
government has incorporated the big educational donors, Portugal and 
Australia, to support the education development. For example, even though 
Portuguese language is used as the language of instruction in schools, 
Australia still provides funds and expertise for curriculum design. It may 
indeed be the case that the government is controlling the DPs much better 
compared to a decade ago (Pires, 2014)
72
  
Both Pires (2014)
73
 & Shah (2012)
74
 admitted that a lack of coordination 
between aid providers and government was the main cause of the poor 
quality of education in Timor-Leste. However, it could be argued that 
educational aid has always contained political power, and therefore drives 
the donor interests instead of the recipient interest. Australia and Portugal 
were not accidently helping Timor-Leste because Timor-Leste needed it, 
nevertheless Australia and Portugal have been providing aid mostly due to 
their own political agendas and interests in Timor-Leste. It was due to the 
fact that Timor-Leste was in a weak position and desperately needed urgent 
help that Australia and Portugal had the opportunity and power to influence 
and shape policy in Timor-Leste including its language policy. 
Consequently, Timor-Leste would depend on Australia and Portugal’s 
policy. This condition had been asserted by a Latin American dependency 
theorist, Dos Santos (1970) saying that “by dependence we mean a situation 
in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the 
                                                               
71 Pires, A. (2014). Interview.  
72 Ibid. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Shah, R. (2012). 
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development and expansion of another economy to which the former is 
subjected. The relationship of interdependence between two or more 
economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of 
dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and 
become self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do 
this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive 
or a negative effect on their immediate development” (p.23)75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               
75 Dos Santos, T. (1970). The Structure of Dependence. American Economic Association, 
231-236. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Portuguese Educational Aid to Timor-Leste 
 
Overview of Portuguese Foreign Policy  
 
Portugal started delivering its educational aid to Timor-Leste immediately 
after the Timorese decided to separate themselves from the Indonesian 
occupation in 1999. As a new-born nation, Timor-Leste has limited friends 
and resources to help develop the nation from the ruins of separation. 
Ultimately, for historical reasons Portugal was the first nation Timorese 
leaders turned to for help. Timor-Leste as a new country desperately needed 
a helping hand to establish its country as well as its institutions. The 
Portuguese took advantage of this to return to Timor-Leste as a hero 
providing salvation to the new country. The government of Portugal uses its 
development cooperation policy as an instrument to strengthen its relations 
to the world. The Portuguese development cooperation is one of the main 
pillars of its foreign policy. Portugal’s cooperation framework strategy 
aimed to consolidate the Timorese institutional framework and support its 
effort to fight against poverty. However, Portuguese assistance to Timor-
Leste clearly shows special attention to the consolidation of Portuguese as 
an official language in a wide range of contexts. Generally, the Portuguese 
foreign policy focuses on the three categories: 
 
“(i) preferential relations with Portuguese-Speaking 
Countries, in particular the five Portuguese-
Speaking African Countries (PALOP) and East 
Timor (Timor-Leste); (ii) the promotion of 
Portuguese in the world as a language community of 
historical value and current worth in this era of 
globalisation; (iii) the promotion of Portuguese 
capacity to hold dialogues and exert influence on 
international issues, directing bi- and multi-lateral 
Portuguese Cooperation to take advantage of 
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Portugal’s standing in some of the international 
decision making centres” (IPAD, 2008. p.7) 76.  
Portuguese development cooperation aims to contribute to a better 
coordination between different national actors to increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of its activities. An important element within its foreign 
policy is the promotion and protection of the Portuguese language and 
culture. The key themes within Portuguese ODA are sustainable economic 
development, human security and the active involvement of Portugal in 
international debates on related topics. Therefore, Portuguese ODA focuses 
especially on Portuguese speaking countries in PALOP and Timor-Leste in 
Asia as well as other countries with which Portugal historically has had tight 
relations. Of the five major development assistances from Portugal, 
education is the top priority among them. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Portugal oversees the overseas assistance through its two main agencies: the 
Portuguese Camoes Institute, promoting Portuguese culture and language, 
and Instituto Portuguese de Apoio Ao Desemvolvimento (IPAD) or 
Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance, coordinating overall 
development. The Portuguese believed that its foreign policy had obviously 
been in line with Timor-Leste’s national priorities and needs. 
 
Portugal is one of the three largest donors to Timor-Leste, and the 
government of Portugal has been visibly influential on the Timorese. One of 
the major areas of Portuguese assistance worldwide is in the education 
sector (IPAD, 2000; 2004; 2008; 2011; & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)
 
77
. Cooperation between Timor-Leste and Portugal began in 1999 on the 
basis of historical ties between the two countries and the need for 
humanitarian aid. Portuguese has well-defined objectives in respect of its 
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development assistance throughout the world. As stated in the IPAD (2010 
& 2011)
78
 and by The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2002)
79
 Portugal is a small 
donor, and hence its development assistance focuses on countries that share 
the language and similar legal systems such as PALOP countries and 
Timor-Leste:  
 
“the language constitutes a key instrument in co-operation with 
Portuguese speaking countries. These countries also have 
administrative and legal systems very similar to those 
prevailing in Portugal. The PALOP (Angola, Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and S. Tomé and Principe), 
together with Timor-Leste, might be seen as Portugal’s “natural 
partners”: beyond language, there are large Portuguese 
communities living there and partners’ communities living in 
Portugal, tight relationships with local people and important 
economic ties” (IPAD, 2011. p.25)80. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation Agreements 
 
Since Timor-Leste’s independence from Indonesia in 1999, Portugal and 
Timor-Leste have signed several important bilateral agreements which form 
the legal basis for cooperation between the two countries. Prior to the full 
independence of Timor-Leste, Portugal and the transitional government of 
Timor-Leste  signed, in 2000, the  cooperation agreement, “Portugal 
Indicative Cooperation Programme to Support the Transition of Timor-
Leste”, in effect from 2000 to 2002.  During this period, Portugal focused 
support on emergency and humanitarian aid, however, the education sector 
also received special attention. Portugal started to support Timor-Leste’s 
education system and consolidated the use of Portuguese as the official 
language by placing a contingent of 160 Portuguese teachers, sending over 
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350 Timorese students to study in Portugal higher education, as well as 
technical and vocational courses. Portuguese educational aid mainly aimed 
to reform Timor-Leste’s education system through training teacher, building 
schools and the reintroduction of the Portuguese language, as well as 
through establishing a Centre for Portuguese language at the National 
University of Timor-Leste (UNTL). This agreement aimed to transform 
emergency aid objectives into development aid objectives. (Ministerio dos 
Negocios Estrangeiros, 2000)
81
.  
 
The second bilateral agreement was the “Indicative Cooperation Programme 
between Portugal and Timor-Leste for 2004-2006” signed in 2004. Under 
this agreement, Portugal prioritised its aid to education and reintroduced the 
Portuguese language through, primary, secondary, technical and vocational 
education and higher education (IPAD, 2004)
82
. The third bilateral 
agreement, signed in 2007, was the “Indicative Cooperation Programme 
between Portugal and Timor-Leste for 2007–2010”. Portuguese assistance 
under this period was focused on the continuation of support to education 
and the consolidation of Portuguese as an official language and institutional 
capacity building. The current Indicative Cooperation Programme between 
Portugal and Timor-Leste signed in 2014 will cover the period of 2014 to 
2017. Portugal continued to deliver its assistance on the basis of the 
continuation of education and consolidation of Portuguese language, 
including basic education, secondary and tertiary education.  
 
Portuguese Educational Aid to Timor-Leste 
 
Portugal maintained a diplomatic role in helping Timor-Leste’s struggle for 
independence during the Indonesian occupation. This level of solidarity and 
experience shows strong emotional ties between the Timorese and the 
Portuguese. Also, the introduction of Portuguese as one of the official 
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languages of Timor-Leste strengthened distinctive relations between both 
countries (OECD, 2006)
83
. In its recent strategic vision, Portugal restated its 
main objective in providing official development aid to its former colonies 
including Timor-Leste. This strategic vision consists of five principals. Two 
of them focus on the MDGs commitment to promoting Portuguese 
language, (IPAD, 2006b). Portugal’s aid to education is provided through 
cooperation projects, and mainly directed to teaching and to training 
teachers, as well as scholarship programmes largely focused on university 
education. Portugal channels its aid to the education sector by sending over 
hundreds of Portuguese teachers and volunteers to Timor-Leste. 
 
Portugal, one of the members and founders of the OECD, played a major 
role in channelling assistance to Timor-Leste, especially in the education 
sector during pre-independence, under the umbrella of the Commissioner 
for Transition Support in East Timor (CATTL) (Instituto Camoes, 2014; & 
IPAD, 2004 & 2008)
84
. The CATTL was a commission to oversee all 
Portuguese aid in Timor-Leste. In addition, according to the Portuguese 
Development Cooperation report from the period 1999-2010, Portugal has 
contributed 497.5m€ to Timor-Leste. However, it is hard to trace the exact 
amount of Portuguese aid from the period 1999-2002 alone. Portuguese 
assistance to Timor-Leste has three official priorities: “first, to consolidate 
the Timorese state; second… to deepen the identity of the Timorese people, 
including through language and culture, and third, to maintain the 
Portuguese language as an official language” (The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 
2002)
85
. The education sector has been the largest beneficiary of Portuguese 
assistance to Timor-Leste since 1999. 
  
Timor-Leste, post-independence, urgently needed assistance to alleviate the 
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country’s suffering. Portugal was very serious in helping Timor-Leste, since 
the country decided to make Portuguese an official language. Portugal’s 
education programme to Timor-Leste has, from the beginning, clearly 
sought to promote the Portuguese language. Portugal played an important 
role and most likely heavily influenced Timorese leaders in adopting the 
Portuguese language as one of the Timorese official languages.  
 
There are fundamental reasons why Portuguese was chosen by Timor-Leste 
as one of the official languages. First, it was because Portugal was the 
former colonial master of Timor-Leste for such a long period, from 1515 to 
1975. Secondly, it was because the Portuguese language had been used as a 
lingua franca during the Timorese resistance against the Indonesian 
occupation. Thirdly, it serves the interest of Timorese political elites who 
speak Portuguese. Fourthly, it is due to the fact that Portugal had assisted 
Timor-Leste during its struggle for independence, through diplomatic 
channels. Thus, Portuguese eases Timor-Leste’s foreign relations and allies 
in the future. Finally, Portugal was considered as a big brother for Timor-
Leste and could help improve Timor-Leste’s education system. Therefore, 
supporters of Portuguese language policy believed that the relationship 
between Timor-Leste and Portugal was based on historical and political ties. 
On the other hand, there were arguments for not choosing Portuguese as an 
official language. Firstly, there were fewer than 5% who could speak 
Portuguese by the time it was adopted to be one of the official languages for 
Timor-Leste. Secondly, there were fewer qualified teachers to be able to 
teach Portuguese. And finally, Portuguese could cause geopolitical 
problems in the region. Timor-Leste aims to join ASEAN and submitted its 
application in February 2011. Timor-Leste has done much work to convince 
ASEAN member states that Timor-Leste is ready to join the region’s largest 
economic and geopolitical organization. However, its language policy and 
allies think the Portuguese to be a stumbling block to joining a bloc where 
no one else speaks the language. It will complicate proceedings of the block 
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and add operational costs and centres of disputes (Savage, 2012)
86
. In 
addition, there are always conditions put by the ASEAN member states. 
Some said Timor-Leste needs to prepare its human resources and 
infrastructure in order to meet ASEAN standards (Pinheiro, 2014 & 
ASEAN, 2014)
87
.  
 
Prior to the independence of Timor-Leste and the development of its 
constitution, Portugal was supposed to have influenced the Timorese leaders 
in adopting the Portuguese language. In fact, the result of Portuguese 
assistance to Timor-Leste had an impact with the adoption of Portuguese 
language as one of Timor-Leste’s official languages. This language policy 
decision determined Timor-Leste’s future friends and allies in the 
international arena. Timor-Leste’s language policy has been controversially 
debated amongst Timorese as well as worldwide observers. Apart from the 
pros and cons that this chapter focused on, it also examines how the 
Portuguese language and Portuguese educational aid influences policy 
making in Timor-Leste. It is particularly concerned with the period between 
October 1999 and May 2002, when Timor-Leste was still governed by the 
UNTAET. The Portuguese took an important chance to implement the 
transformation in educational aid that was called for by Timorese leaders. 
This was due to the extensive damage to Timor-Leste’s education system 
during Indonesia’s violent withdrawal in 1999. It also discussed Portuguese 
foreign policy in meeting the needs of the Timorese request, and assessed 
Portuguese influence in shaping the educational policy that is now emerging 
in Timor-Leste. Nonetheless, Portugal’s efforts in supporting the education 
sector lacked legitimacy and thus popular acceptance from the majority of 
people of Timor-Leste. 
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The birth of the tiny nation of Timor-Leste came at a heavy price for its 
people after years of colonization, occupation and transition, with conflict, 
oppression and bloodshed. When the Timorese finally won their 
independence from Indonesia, surprisingly, national leaders immediately 
sought to strengthen their relationship with the Portuguese. The relationship 
between the two nations has been strong and interwoven since then. It is 
driven by the desire to forge a national identity that differentiated Timor-
Leste from Indonesia and consolidated its ties with Portugal. The two 
countries’ relationship can be traced back from the past to the present time. 
Portuguese had first come into contact with the Islanders of Timor in around 
1515, and colonised half the island  (the other half  of the island was later 
ruled by the Dutch) known as Portuguese-Timor (Timor-Leste at present 
day). The Portuguese ruled Portuguese-Timor from the late 16
th
 century to 
late 1975. The Portuguese left the Timorese in 1975 with a civil war, then 
automatically legitimised and opened the way for Indonesia to invade and 
annex Portuguese-Timor to become its 27
th
 province and renamed it Timor-
Timur for the next 24 years. Finally, through a referendum on self-
determination under the United Nations (UN) supervision in August 1999, 
the Timorese overwhelmingly voted to separate themselves from Indonesia, 
and established a new government with the new name of the state, Timor-
Leste. The country’s name itself is derived from the Portuguese words 
meaning East Timor. Under the UN transitional administration, the 
language used for preparing the Timorese to become an independent 
country is English. Hence, the language policy and educational politics in 
Timor-Leste shaped by three significant periods reflect its recent history; it 
has had four names, reflecting the different languages that have been 
prominent at different times: East Timor (English), Timor-Leste 
(Portuguese), Timor-Timur (Indonesian), and Timor Lorosa’e (Tetum) 
(Shah & Quinn, 2014; & Macalister, 2012)
88
.   
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Notwithstanding, during the 24 years of the occupation, Indonesia had 
produced numerous reliable human resources and a great deal of 
infrastructure compared with Portugal, which colonised Timor-Leste for 
over 400 years and left almost nothing. However, the Indonesian influence 
on Timor-Leste after independence was not as strong as Portugal’s due to 
Indonesian violations of human rights under its brutal military regime. The 
Portuguese language has made a comeback to Timor-Leste, after 24 years of 
being prohibited when the country was under Indonesian occupation at the 
end of the twentieth century. In 2002, Timor-Leste adopted Portuguese and 
Tetum – Timorese indigenous language – as its co-official languages. 
Nonetheless, less than 5% of the Timorese population spoke Portuguese at 
the time Portuguese was adopted. Prior to the introduction of the 2002 
language policy, the Portuguese government and the Timorese transitional 
government made an immediate effort to reintroduce Portuguese language 
through training hundreds of Timorese teachers in Portuguese between 1999 
and 2002. Portuguese is being steadily employed as the language of 
instruction, as part of the move to make it the national language. In late 
2001, some 500 teachers from Portugal were placed in primary schools 
throughout Timor-Leste to train both students and teachers in Portuguese. 
Coinciding with this, some 500 Timorese were sent to Portugal to train as 
teachers (in Portuguese). It was anticipated that by the time the first cohort 
of Year One students reach junior secondary school, they will be proficient 
in Portuguese. Also, six months after Timor-Leste was recognised by the 
UN as an independent state, Portugal immediately established an official 
Portuguese School in December 2002 in Dili known as “Escola Portuguesa 
Ruy Cinatti Timor-Leste” (Pires, 2014)89. 
 
Although Portugal was the former colonial master of Timor-Leste, its 
language was adopted as one of the official languages of Timor-Leste and 
written into the constitution of the country. As a former Portuguese colony, 
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Timor-Leste has a proportion of Portuguese speakers. According to the 
2010 national census of Timor-Leste on literacy rates for people aged 15-24, 
Portuguese speakers have risen to 39.3% in 2010 from only 17.2% in 2004 
(Taylor-Leech, 2013; & Statistics Timor-Leste, 2010)
 90
. Prior to 2004, the 
numbers of Portuguese speakers were less than 5%. The steady rise in 
spoken Portuguese suggests that, although the Portuguese had left Timor-
Leste more than two decades before, in the early 2000s the cultural legacy 
of Portugal was still strongly felt, particularly through the Roman Catholic 
religion. The Portuguese Catholic missionaries who first arrived in Timor-
Leste (Portuguese-Timor back then) started to run schooling and teaching. 
The missionaries then converted the Timorese to Catholicism. The colonial 
legacies of Portugal are still strongly tied to the Timorese, obliging the 
Portuguese to provide educational assistance. 
 
The Advantages of Portuguese in Timor-Leste  
 
Although Portugal had colonised Timor-Leste for 450 years, Timor-Leste 
thought of Portugal as a big brother. The Timor-Leste government has 
chosen to use Portuguese as its official language of government since 2002 
despite the fact that less than 5% of the population spoke the language. The 
government chose Portuguese to safeguard their unique culture and identity, 
maintain their connections with the former colonial master, Portugal, as well 
as their privileged ties and friendships with other Portuguese-speaking 
nations (Taylor-Leech, 2013)
91
. Physically, Portugal had left Timor-Leste in 
1975, however, as Pires (2014)
92
, understood, the Portuguese support to 
Timor-Leste continues and may always be with the Timorese. Pires is sure 
                                                               
90
Taylor-Leech, K. (2013). Finding Space for Non-dominant languages in Education: 
Language Policy and Medium of Instruction in Timor-Leste 2000-2012. Graffith 
Institute for Educational Research, Graffith University, Queensland, Australia; &  
Dirrecao Nacional Estatistica  (2010). Highlight of the 2010 Census Main Result in 
Timor-Leste. Dili, Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste. 
91
 Taylor-Leech, K. (2013). 
92 Pires, A. (2014). Interview.  
 37 
 
that the Portuguese actively assisted Timor-Leste through diplomatic 
channels and various ways in their struggle for self-determination towards 
the Indonesian occupation. As young brother, Timor-Leste does not want to 
lose that friendship and support. According to Pires, Timor-Leste 
considered Portugal as a resource and the closest friend which it could ask 
for the support necessary to building a new government from scratch. Thus, 
the adoption of Portuguese as one of the official languages along with 
Tetum – the Timorese native language (Assembly Constituent, 2002) 93 – 
was a way to tighten the brotherhood. Due to the adoption of Portuguese, 
Timor-Leste was later accepted as a full member of the Community of 
Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP in Portuguese acronym). The CPLP 
is composed of eight states. Portugal is the only European nation, five states 
are African, Brazil is the only South American nation, and Timor-Leste the 
only Asian state. The objective of CPLP is to work together to achieve 
shared prosperity, to reduce poverty and bring progress and stability across 
the Portuguese speaking world (Gusmao, 2014)
94
. According to Pires 
(2014)
95
, Portugal’s assistance to Timor-Leste’s education development 
from 1999 to the present time has had a significant impact compared to 
other countries and organisations. Portugal started its first aid project to 
Timor-Leste in 1999 with the introduction of the Portuguese language. Pires 
noted that there have been two major donors to the education sector in 
Timor-Leste: Portugal and Australia. Portugal, on the one hand, has been 
the largest donor to Timor-Leste’s education in terms of its activities and 
technical support. On the other hand, Australia has been one of the largest 
donors in terms of financial assistance. Portugal is more of an influence on 
the education system because of its provision of technical assistance, while 
Australia’s influence is more limited because it only provides financial 
assistance. Australia has a lesser real input into decision making on the 
policy direction of education in Timor-Leste.   
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Timor-Leste has a multilingual landscape and the extent to which the 
Timorese are polyglots is shown by the numbers of Timorese that speak two 
or more languages. Although many people are concerned that the use of 
Portuguese would be difficult, particularly for the youngest Timorese, the 
government of Timor-Leste believed that all Timorese would succeed. The 
process of learning and dissemination of the Portuguese language to 
Timorese has been through several phases. For example, from 1999 to 2002, 
Portugal started the first project in Timor-Leste entitled ‘the reintroduction 
of Portuguese’, and continues with the phases of consolidation until today. 
Portugal has provided educational aid to Timor-Leste over the past 14 years, 
and committed to continue to support Timor-Leste. The leaders of Timor-
Leste from the first government until the present government have always 
been outwardly adoring of the Portuguese in their positions. The former 
Timorese Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmao
96
, for example, on his speech on 
the occasion of a two-day meeting with donor partners in Timor-Leste in 
July 2014 proudly announced that “Portuguese language has enormous 
significance for Timorese people and their cultures” (Gusmao, 2014)97. He 
also said that currently Timor-Leste assumes the rotating Presidency of the 
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) for the biennium 
2014-2016. Hence, Timor-Leste would use this opportunity to deepen the 
economic cooperation between member states and open up trade 
opportunities in the Asia Pacific and across the globe. The bilateral 
cooperation between Portugal and Timor-Leste is getting stronger with the 
current new agreement signed by both the Minister of Education of Portugal 
and the Minister of Education of Timor-Leste on the 8
th
 January 2015 in 
Portugal. Under this new agreement, Portugal committed to boost 
cooperation in the education sector. The agreement sets out a protocol for 
the implementation and operation of the project “School Learning and 
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Teacher Training Centres of Timor-Leste” which would involve around 150 
Portuguese teachers coming to Timor-Leste in 2015 (Pereira, 2015)
98
. 
 
Da Silva Sarmento (2013)
99, in his unpublished thesis “Lusophonization 
Return? The Condition of Language Policy and Planning in a Post-Colonial 
Plurilingual Timor-Leste”, had done several interviews in Timor-Leste with 
a few of the country’s key national stakeholders including Members of 
Parliament. Their opinions and comments mainly favoured Portuguese as 
one of Timor-Leste’s official languages. Government officials and Members 
of Parliament believed that it was the correct choice for Timor-Leste 
because of its long history with Portuguese. The Portuguese language has 
been used during the administration of Portuguese-Timor, and also as a 
lingua franca during resistance against the occupation of Indonesia. In the 
Da Silva Sarmento (2013)
100
 findings, the Timorese MPs reiterated that 
Timor-Leste’s decision to adopt Portuguese as an official language was 
partly because the historical connections with Portugal and Timor-Leste 
upheld their uniqueness in the Southeast Asia region. MPs also argued 
against adopting Indonesian and English as official languages because of 
Indonesia’s recent occupation and the possible domination of the 
Australians. 
 
Hence, these leaders argued Timorese and Portuguese are like two sides of 
the same coin. In addition, the Portuguese advocates commented that it is a 
better opportunity for Timorese to have access to European markets through 
Portugal’s assistance, because Timor-Leste’s constitution permits its 
citizens to have dual nationality. Therefore, many Timorese have chosen to 
adopt Portuguese nationality as their second choice nationality. As a result, 
since independence, a large number of Timorese have been working in 
several European countries such as the United Kingdom and Northern 
                                                               
98
 Pereira, A. (2015). Portugal Boosts Cooperation in the Education Sector. Media 
Release. Republica Democratic de Timor-Leste (RDTL). Dili, Timor-Leste. 
99
Da Silva Sarmento, J. (2013). 
100
 Ibid. 
 40 
 
Ireland. Additionally, through the CPLP, which share the same histories and 
experiences, Timor-Leste has gained an advantage in accessing support and 
help before and after the independence. Most proponents of the Portuguese 
as well as the policy makers who chose to adopt Portuguese as the official 
language for Timor-Leste were from the older generation. The older 
generations are those who have lived during the Portuguese colonization 
and Timor-Leste’s struggle for independence against the Indonesian 
occupation. These generations totally opposed the Indonesian influence in 
Timor-Leste, including its language. Ignoring the potential benefits of 
adopting Bahasa Indonesia or English are many Timorese with greater ties 
to Indonesia than to Portugal.  
 
Another reason for the adoption of Portuguese as one of Timor-Leste’s 
official languages is because Tetum
101
 is still an oral language. Timor-Leste 
needs a modern and developed language to accompany Tetum as a backup, 
and the adoption of Portuguese is the perfect choice (Da Silva Sarmento, 
2013 & Horta, 2012)
102
. Although Tetum today is spoken by almost 90% of 
Timorese people, Tetum is still in the process of becoming a truly modern, 
and functional language. It needs a long time for its establishment. A 
number of Timorese individuals (Da Silva Sarmento, 2013 & Horta, 
2012)
103
 expressed their confidence that Tetum in one or two decades would 
become a very colourful, rich and dynamic language. Portuguese on the 
other hand is a developed language, able to convey institutional and 
scientific knowledge.  Pires (2014)
104
 therefore believed that the adoption of 
Portuguese was the proper decision for Timor-Leste, and economically 
benefited both Timorese and Portuguese. On the one hand, Timor-Leste 
uses Portugal as a bridge to access Europe, while on the other hand Portugal 
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would like to have access to Asia through Timor-Leste. Also, Timor-Leste 
wanted to differentiate itself from its neighbours, particularly Indonesia, and 
feel unique in the Asian region and particularly in the Southeast Asia 
region. Even with the standardising of Tetum, noted Taylor-Leech 
(2005)
105
, the Instituto Nacional de Linguistica (INL) at the  Universidade 
Nacional Timor-Leste (National University of Timor-Leste or UNTL), 
responsible in producing an official orthography for Tetum, used Portuguese 
and other local dialects as the sources for borrowing or coining words and 
tried to avoid Indonesian.  
 
Portuguese and Tetum have become Timor-Leste’s co-official languages 
and are written into Timor-Leste’s constitution. Thus, according to Pires 
(2014)
106
, it will be difficult to change or replace the official languages 
without a referendum to amend the constitution. As the 2010 national 
census has shown, Portuguese is now “facing in” – that is, increasing its 
numbers of speakers – while Indonesian is “facing out” – or decreasing its 
number of speakers – in Timor-Leste. In June 2011, with the UN mission 
still present in Timor-Leste, the government issued a resolution to the UN 
and its agencies, the EU, and Timorese state institutions to strengthen and 
promote immediately the use of official languages by all means, in 
particular the Portuguese language in the public domain (Secretariat of State 
of the Council of Ministers, 2011)
107
.  
 
The Disadvantages of Portuguese in Timor-Leste 
 
Despite the fact the language policy decision may have strengthened ties 
between Portugal and Timor-Leste, some individuals (Shah & Quinn, 2014; 
Macalister, 2013; Da Silva Sarmento, 2013; Shah, 2012; Savage, 2012; 
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Appleby, 2006; & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)
 108
 argued that the 
decision to use Portuguese as Timor-Leste’s official language has been and 
continues to be controversial, particularly among younger Timorese. These 
individuals further say that the younger generations concerned about their 
cultures have been ignored and undermined, and that their national language 
– Tetum – has been devalued. Moreover, these younger generations cannot 
speak Portuguese because they were taught only in Indonesian language 
during the Indonesian occupation. The counter argument against the 
adoption of Portuguese language further said the language policy of Timor-
Leste only serves the few Timorese elites who speak Portuguese. This in 
fact causes a geopolitical problem in the region and slows down the 
country’s development.  
 
While Timor-Leste begins to find its feet, it faces new issues on its colonial 
legacies in defining the language policy. Both Portugal and Indonesia have 
powerfully influenced the decision-making of Timor-Leste post-
independence. Portugal, however, was arguably more important. As soon as 
Timor-Leste resumed its full independence from the UN on the 20
th
 May 
2002, the first representatives of the people (Timorese first National 
Parliament) and the country’s first government surprisingly decided to adopt 
Portuguese as one of the official languages for the new-born Timor-Leste 
along with Tetum. Indonesian was recognised only as one of the working 
languages, together with English. Articles 13 and 159 of Timor-Leste’s 
Constitution stipulate that Tetum and Portuguese are Timor-Leste’s official 
languages and that Indonesian and English are Timor-Leste working 
languages (Assembly Constituent, 2002)
109
. The adoption of Portuguese as a 
part of the language policy of Timor-Leste has brought a controversial 
debate among Timorese, who are directly affected by the country’s leaders’ 
policy. It also caused concerns and reactions abroad. Younger Timorese 
generations claimed that the language policy decision made by the older 
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generation was unilateral, taken without concern or even consultation with 
the whole Timorese population. Therefore, language policy in Timor-Leste 
remains a major debatable issue and is still controversial among Timorese 
(Taylor-Leech, 2011 & 2013; Savage, 2012; & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 
2002)
110
. Many Timorese were surprised when Portuguese was adopted 
because less than 5% Portuguese speakers could not represent the majority 
of Timorese, of whom approximately 75% spoke Bahasa Indonesian and 
almost 80% Tetum. The Timorese language policy was rushed and 
unilateral. In addition, while a lot of money has been poured in by Portugal 
both pre- and post-independence for more than a decade, the quality of 
education in Timor-Leste continues to be poor. On the one hand, perhaps 
the educational aid provided by Portugal so far has not been in the interests 
of the Timorese, while on the other hand, perhaps Portugal is more 
concerned with pushing its own agenda in line with its own national 
interests. What were better choices if Portuguese was not the first option 
chosen by Timorese leaders for its language policy? Alternatively, while 
awaiting the development of Tetum into a scientific and modern language, 
English and or Bahasa could be the best options. Tetum is a native language 
to Timorese, almost 80% of whom are speakers. It has this advantage 
though it needs to be developed in order to meet scientific and modern 
standards. In addition, English has huge advantages and is an international 
language as well as a language of trading. While Bahasa Indonesia speakers 
number 75%, this could also be a good choice if Timor-Leste wanted to 
safeguard its younger generation who studied during Indonesian occupation 
under Indonesia’s education system. Also, the majority of the previous and 
current government officials are occupied by the younger generation who 
studied in various universities in Indonesia.   
 
It could be argued that the adoption of Portuguese as an official Timorese 
language was motivated largely by political and historical interest. As 
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obvious for many Timorese, older generations perceived Portuguese as part 
of their culture and already integrated in Timorese life. The Portuguese 
colonisation of Timor-Leste for 450 years has basically influenced Timorese 
culture in various ways, particularly in language but also through Roman 
Catholicism which 90% of Timorese follow (Government of Timor-Leste, 
2014)
111
. Portuguese traditions are also felt in Timorese dance. Therefore, 
the important note underlined by Altbach (1971)
112
 is very similar to what 
has occurred in Timor-Leste today. As Altbach noted, modern neo-
colonialism in developing countries has not involved direct political control 
from the dominant countries. However, a few aspects of mastership are still 
maintained by developed nations over their former colonies. Altbach further 
argued that most emerging countries’ education systems at almost every 
level are deeply-rooted in the administrative structures of the former 
colonial rulers. Also the former colonial countries tended to use their former 
colonial language as the medium of instruction in their education systems 
and administration services. Portugal, as Timor-Leste’s former colonial 
power, has been keen to offer foreign aid and technical assistance in helping 
design curriculum, and in the provision of physical facilities and other 
educational materials including books. Altbach (1971)
113
 coined the term 
neo-colonialism to designate the continued post-colonial impact of the 
advanced industrial countries on the educational systems and policies as 
well as the intellectual life of developing areas. Portugal’s practice in 
providing educational aid to Timor-Leste could be regarded as neo-
colonialism as discussed by Altbach.  
 
Also Thiong’o (1986) 114  discusses the erosion of the African national 
languages by the arrival of foreign languages, very often European 
languages. Although the conquest or colonization has physically ended, the 
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colonization of the mind, spirit, and culture of Timor-Leste are still ongoing. 
Portuguese aid practices have developed along similar lines to the behaviour 
discussed by Thiong’o (1986)115, concerned that aid is in the main weapon 
of Western nations, keen for the third world to remain subject to colonial 
powers manifest in another form. Thus neo-colonialism is embedded in 
various fields, including in the education system. Modern colonisation of 
the mind and spirit is introduced in the process of education. Although 
Thiong’o (1986) studied European languages’ influence on the African 
continent and it has been more than two decades since the studies took 
place, his thought is still relevant to the present, as the Timorese have 
encountered the same situation in their language policy. Timorese elites 
believed that their former colonial master, Portugal, could not be separated 
from Timorese cultures because it is already assimilated in Timorese lives. 
Under Portuguese rule, all education was through the medium of 
Portuguese, and Timorese languages used only when necessary. Therefore, 
Portuguese particularly influenced the dialect of Tetum, which was mainly 
spoken in the capital, Dili, known as Tetum Prasa. Tetum Prasa is the 
version more widely used, and is now taught in all levels of schools together 
with Portuguese.  
 
Nonetheless, the language policy decision was contrary to the wishes of the 
majority of the younger generations of the country, which are the children 
and grandchildren of those older generations. Also, these young generations 
studied and grew up during the Indonesian period, and the majority of them 
could not even speak and write in Portuguese. 
 
Some individuals, researchers and Timorese people who are directly 
affected by the language policy have been unhappy with the country’s 
elites’ policy decision. These opponent groups believed that the decision 
was due to the arrogance of Timorese elites who attempted to ignore and 
differentiate from Indonesian influence and lean back towards its former 
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colonial master Portugal (Taylor-Leech 2008 & 2013; Sarmento, 2013; 
Savage 2012, Horta, 2012; Laohamutuk, 2002 & 2012; & Macalister, 
2012)
116
. Most young Timorese grew up throughout the Indonesian 
occupation and have never spoken Portuguese at all, because the Indonesian 
authority banned Portuguese during its occupation. Da Silva Sarmento 
(2013)
117
 interviewed a few teachers in Timor-Leste’s schools. These 
educators were concerned that the language policy in Timor-Leste was only 
chosen to satisfy some big egos from people in politics. The politicians have 
never thought about the majority of young generations who grew up with 
the Indonesian language. These teachers are aware that freedom has brought 
a new language to them but also another aspect of neo-colonialism. 
Additionally, Shah (2012)
118
 discovered, during his experiences at the MoE 
for four years as a curriculum designer, documented evidence and 
interviews with primary teachers, principals, and stakeholders between 
donor providers and the MoE as part of his doctoral study. He noted that in 
early 2000, in order to save and preserve the continuation of the learning 
process in Timor-Leste after separating from Indonesia’s occupation, 
Timor-Leste’s transition government recruited numbers of primary school 
teachers, the majority of whom were not qualified to teach. However, 
Portugal was the most significant player in the realm of teacher training due 
to its “comparative language advantage” in meeting the demands of early 
governments to focus initial teacher training on the reintroduction of 
Portuguese into the classroom.  
 
Studies by Shah (2012)
119
 examine the problems caused by donors due to 
the lack of coordination between aid providers and the government of 
Timor-Leste and how this has led to the poor quality of education in Timor-
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Leste. Also, Da Silva Sarmento (2013)
120
 restated Timor-Leste’s national 
stakeholders’ views that Portuguese should be an official language for 
Timor-Leste due to the political and historical ties between the two nations. 
In light of studies, findings and observations, it is an appealing idea that 
Portuguese aid to the education of Timor-Leste is supposedly offered with 
no strings attached, as asserted in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. It has had a huge effect on Timor-Leste’s policy making, 
especially the adopting of the Portuguese language into Timor-Leste’s 
official languages. By using its aid influences from 1999-2002, prior to 
Timor-Leste’s independence, Portugal finally won the hearts of Timorese 
national leaders by convincing them to adopt its language as one of Timor’s 
official languages the same day as Timor-Leste received its independence.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Arguments can be made for or against using the Portuguese language as an 
official language, as expressed by some researchers and individuals 
including Da Silva Sarmento (2013), Savage (2012), Shah (2012), Horta 
(2012), Taylor-Leech (2012), among others. They said that language policy 
is always hardly debated in Timor-Leste, and that there are reasons to do 
with power on the one side and intellectual reason on the other. What 
significance has the amount of Portuguese aid available, and Portugal’s 
foreign policy interest played in this debate?  Clearly it has pushed the 
Portuguese language into being adopted officially and promoted in practice 
in Timor-Leste.  
 
Is the great desire of Portugal to provide educational aid to Timor-Leste in 
response to the will of the Timorese people? It could be understood that the 
relationship between Timor-Leste and Portugal can easily account for the 
importance these two countries put on interdependence. Timor-Leste was in 
a weak position when the decision to offer aid was made. Due to the urgent 
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need for Timor-Leste’s development, national leaders had little choice but 
to follow Portuguese advice. Portugal took advantage of this situation to 
influence Timorese leaders and push its national interests through its aid 
agenda. Portuguese education aid, offered mainly to support the expansion 
of the Portuguese agenda, is very much in line with its foreign policy. 
Additionally, in advance and to strengthen its influence in Timor-Leste, 
Portugal has also set up its own schools, ranging from elementary to high 
school, in Dili, since 2002. The teaching format, curriculum and subjects are 
designed according to the original format and style in Portugal. The Timor-
Leste government recognised the Portuguese Schools in 2006, as confirmed 
by the current General Director of the MoE Timor-Leste (Pires, 2014)
121
. 
 
Timor-Leste language policy has been closely associated with its historical 
context, throughout decades of social and political change. What linguistics 
calls “exogenous languages” (or foreign languages, such as Portuguese, 
Bahasa Indonesia, and English), have been associated with the dominant 
political forces at different times. Portuguese assistance in the educational 
development of Timor-Leste is inevitable, and therefore shapes Timor-
Leste’s policy making. Long term problems have been caused (by donors, 
UNTAET and the government of Timor-Leste) to the education system in 
2004-2005 through the ‘access first, quality later’ approach (Millo & 
Barnett, 2004; Nicolai, 2004; World Bank, 2004; MEC, 2005; Beck, 2008; 
all cited in Shah, 2012)
 122
.  
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Due to its weak position prior to independence and in the early stages of 
independence, Timor-Leste was considerably rushed in its language policy 
making, particularly in adopting Portuguese as one of the country’s official 
languages. The decision makers considered the relationship between the two 
nations had been established based on historical and political ties. These 
dated back to early Portuguese colonization, over 400 years earlier, and 
continued throughout Timor’s struggle for independence. Timorese leaders 
considered this connection with Portugal to have become a source of moral 
and financial support, especially at the beginning of independence. Because 
of the long connection with Portugal, the Tetum language today contains 
many ‘loan words’ from Portuguese known as Tetum-Prasa. Portuguese has 
been constitutionally legislated as one of the two national languages (with 
Tetum being the other). The assistance, prior to the independence of Timor-
Leste and development of its constitution, given by the Portuguese to 
Timor-Leste had its consequences with the adoption of Portuguese language 
to be one of Timor’s official languages. Portugal, as an external donor, was 
supposed to have influenced the Timorese leaders to adopt Portuguese. The 
evidence shows that less than 5% of Timorese could speak Portuguese by 
this time.  
 
More than 14 years later, with the support of Portugal and other Portuguese-
speaking countries such as Brazil, the quality of education in Timor-Leste 
remains poor and numbers of Portuguese speakers have increased to only 
39%. The decision to return to its colonial heritage has determined Timor-
Leste’s friends and allies. The language policy also has future implications 
for Timor-Leste’s development and geopolitical relations in the region as 
well as around the globe. Geographically, Timor-Leste is located in the 
Southeast Asia region. The country has shown its interest in joining 
ASEAN, yet it has not been allowed to become a member. This is perhaps 
because of its language policy and its allies’ relations. Politically, Timor-
Leste is an independent state, but economically, Timor-Leste cannot 
separate itself from its geopolitical links and the associated geopolitical 
realities of Indonesia and Australia. Many Timorese government officials 
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and educational personnel have graduated from universities and technical 
institutes in Indonesia. As currently reported by Dili Weekly News, an 
estimated 5000 Timorese students are currently enrolled in Indonesian 
universities (Freitas, 2014)
123
. 
   
Timor-Leste’s language policy has been controversially debated amongst 
Timorese as well as worldwide observers. Portuguese aid continues to shape 
educational policy in Timor-Leste. Nonetheless, the quality of education in 
Timor-Leste remains poor due to the fact that Portugal’s efforts in 
supporting the education sector lacks legitimacy and thus popular 
acceptance from the majority of people of Timor-Leste. One of the 
disadvantages of choosing Portuguese as the official language of Timor-
Leste is that it slows down the growth and development of progress in 
Timor-Leste (Taylor-Leech, 2011)
124
. The entire administration in the 
public domain has to be written in Portuguese and yet there are not many 
people who speak and write in Portuguese. Worse still most government 
officials are inexperienced and unqualified as well as lack Portuguese 
proficiency. They need to learn a new language, but this will take time. 
Finally, because the government hired hundreds of Portuguese advisors and 
mentors and other expertise, much of the money offered as support by the 
Portuguese has, in large amounts, returned to Portugal in salaries and 
expenses. While Little & Clifford (1966)
125
 argue that donors have made 
specific commitments to ensure that development assistance comes with no 
strings attached, in fact, foreign aid does not benefit but increases poverty in 
developing countries. It benefits the political elites of the recipients and the 
donors’ interests. Furthermore, donor countries have implemented their aid 
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programmes in such a way that they maximise the economic benefits of 
their own states and citizens.   
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CHAPTER THREE: Australian Educational Aid to Timor-Leste 
 
Australia has spent a lot of money in Timor-Leste since the country gained 
its independence. Even though Australia proclaims its aid to Timor-Leste is 
focused on humanitarian and development assistance, like other donor 
countries its foreign policy interest is also an influence. The Australian aid 
to Timor-Leste aims to help political stability and also to protect its oil 
interests in the area. The Australian aid relationship with Timor-Leste is 
thus designed to maintain and secure Australian interests. This is evidenced 
by the number of Australian scholarship awards offered to Timorese 
students, the vocational training given to government officials, and the role 
of Dili International School which trains the children of Timorese elites.  
 
Overview of Australian Foreign Policy to Timor-Leste 
 
Australia, one of Timor-Leste’s nearest neighbours (and a better-developed 
country), was, with Portugal, the first to help the newly independent nation 
in 1999. Since then, Australia has been one of the largest aid providers to 
Timor-Leste (Pires, 2014)
126
. Australia has many channels through which to 
deliver its assistance throughout the world. However, its key aid assistance 
agency to Timor-Leste was AusAID. Prior to 2002, AusAID was an 
autonomous agency, subsequently it has been merged into the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) of Australia. AusAID aims to advance 
Australia's national interest by assisting developing countries to reduce 
poverty and achieve sustainable development, especially in the Asia Pacific 
region. As the Australian government confirms, its assistance to Timor-
Leste, just over 1bnUSD, has been used for the construction of the newly 
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independent state of Timor-Leste (Australian Government-DFAT, 2015)
127
. 
Australian assistance initially focused on humanitarian and infrastructure 
aid rather than education. In the period of the Timorese transitional 
government from 1999 to 2002, Australian humanitarian assistance 
undertaken by AusAID was the largest ever. The Australian government 
reported that its aid contributed to emergency food, shelter, and medical 
supplies, and provided transport and logistics for international aid efforts. 
The Australian aid delivered by multilateral institutions and NGOs provided 
basic services throughout the transitional period.  
 
After Timor-Leste gained its full independence in 2002, the Australian 
government was seeking to incorporate its aid with the government of 
Timor-Leste’s national priorities. For instance, several institutions and 
ministries were established under Australian mentorship, including the 
Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste. 
Following civil unrest in Dili in 2006, Australian changed its aid back to 
humanitarian aid to assist hundreds of thousands of Timorese displaced 
from their homes. Then, between 2007 and 2010, Australian aid focused on 
improving political stability and assisting the government’s development 
institutions. Indeed, after nearly a decade in delivering assistance to Timor-
Leste, Australia realised its assistance had not properly reached the targets 
which the Timorese demanded. Several agreements were signed by both 
governments prior to 2011, but the 2011 Strategic Planning Agreements for 
Development is considered the key document (AusAID, 2012)
128
. This 
agreement sets out how Australian aid would support Timor-Leste to 
achieve the MDGs, particularly eradicating extreme hunger and poverty, 
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and achieving the goal of universal primary education (MoF, 2013)
129
. Since 
then, Australia has committed to working closely with the government of 
Timor-Leste to promote opportunities for all by increasing access to quality 
education.  
 
It is inevitable that the relationship between Australia and Timor-Leste is 
difficult to separate from the history of the two countries, even though there 
are unpleasant aspects to this story. Some say the history of Timor-Leste 
and its road to independence was considerably influenced by the policy of 
Australia, the regional power in the region. Dr. Ishizuka (2004)
130
 for 
example, a scholar from University of Kyoei, Japan, pointed out that the 
Australians’ policies towards Timor-Leste have changed from time to time. 
These policies have always benefited Australians, from the time Timor-
Leste was still under Portuguese rule, to the Indonesian military regime, and 
indeed during the independence of Timor-Leste. For example, when 
Australia recognised Indonesian sovereignty in Timor-Leste after the 1975 
invasion, because Australia wanted to secure and maintain security in the 
region, it was most important to negotiate a favourable commercial 
agreement on the oil-rich Timor-Sea. Where Australia has exercised its 
coercive power most flagrantly is in the economic area. By the same token, 
Ayson (2007)
131
 pointed out the perception of an ‘arc of instability’ 
underlying the Australian strategic and political attention to its closest 
neighbourhood. Even though Australian policy guidance was not clear in 
addressing such instability, Australia considered itself a prosperous and 
politically stable country looking out for its closest northern neighbours who 
comprised a chain of countries with weakened economies, institutional 
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deficits and significant domestic instabilities. Australians led an intervention 
force into Timor-Leste in 1999 and again in 2006, proving its ‘arc of 
instability’ theory. However, in late 2000, for example, Businessweek 
reported that Australian diplomats were pressuring Timorese officials to 
accept the same deal that Australia had negotiated with Indonesia, with the 
threat that failure to do so would result in a cut-off of its aid programmes 
(Navins, 2004, & Businessweek, 2000)
132
. Evidently, in June 2005 Australia 
terminated funding to a local NGO in Timor-Leste, Forum Tau Matan 
(FTM), because together with other national NGOs, it openly protested 
against Australia’s policy on the sea border between the two countries 
(Nautilus Institute, 2013 & Lao Hamutuk, 2007)
133
. The Australians referred 
to the deal or treaty that it had signed with Indonesia in 1989, known as the 
Timor Gap Treaty. The treaty aimed to share resources in a joint 
development zone of the Timor Gap. In fact, Timor-Leste and Australia has 
territorial disputes over the control of oil resources, colouring diplomacy 
between the two countries. The Australian foreign aid to Timor-Leste is one 
way to avoid the issue of negotiation over the maritime border.  
 
Educational Aid 
 
Despite the dispute over the maritime boundary and other accusations 
between Timorese and Australians, the Australian government has, since 
1999, and as acknowledged by the government of Timor-Leste, 
demonstrated good faith to help Timor-Leste. In practice, however, Timor-
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Leste more likely favours Portugal as a close friend as reflected in Timor-
Leste’s language policy. Although English is not an official language in 
Timor-Leste like Portuguese, its influence among Timorese, particularly the 
young generations, is quite significant, despite the fact that English is 
recognised only as one of the working languages together with Bahasa 
Indonesia. Article 159 of the Timor-Leste Constitution stipulates that 
“Indonesian and English shall be working languages within civil service 
side by side with official languages as long as deemed necessary” 
(Assembly Constituent, 2002)
134
. The recent national census of Timor-Leste 
revealed that English literacy for people aged from 15 to 24 has more than 
doubled from 10% in 2004 to 22.3% in 2010 (Direccao Nacional Estatistica, 
2010)
135
. Timor-Leste’s leaders had privately defended keeping the 
Portuguese language as a matter of heritage, but at the same time they have 
also recognised the importance of learning English in schools to survive in a 
competitive world. They have also acknowledged Bahasa Indonesia.  
 
The language policy of Timor-Leste upset Australia, as found by Taylor-
Leech (2007)
136
 in his unpublished PhD thesis: “Canberra did not want East 
Timor to choose Portuguese as its national language or model its 
constitution on that of Portugal” (p.5), Australia failed to convince Timorese 
leaders that time, and yet Australia’s assistance to Timor-Leste was not 
affected by the language policy too much, because English as the official 
language of Australia has also been acknowledged in the legislation of 
Timor-Leste. Macalister (2012)
137
 – a senior researcher at Linguistics 
Studies at Victoria University of Wellington – in his current research into 
language policy in Timor-Leste, argued that the existence of the UN and 
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other international NGOs could influence the development of English in 
Timor-Leste; as long as the UN mission and other international NGOs 
continue to work in Timor-Leste, the development of English will also be 
developed. Macalister (2012)
138
 further expected that Australia, as the 
largest and one of the Anglophone donor countries to Timor-Leste, as well 
as a dominant power in the region, might help in influencing the 
development of English in the country. Some other factors believed to 
potentially influence the language policy in Timor-Leste will be shifts in 
economic power and the emergence of a new generation of political leaders. 
 
The Australian government claimed that since 1999 it has provided 
assistance worth more than 1bnUSD to Timor-Leste. This support is in the 
form of humanitarian and development aid (Australia Government-DFAT, 
2013)
139
. Meanwhile, the government of Timor-Leste officially reported that 
the Australian assistance to Timor-Leste from 2011 to 2014 has reached 
607,151,000.22USD, or just over half a billion. The education sector alone 
has received 65,442.000.19USD or approximately 11% of the total amount 
(MoF, 2014b)
140
. MoF, in collaboration with donor partners, is working to 
collect historical information prior to 2010. Hence, disbursement data may 
be larger than the current data. Additionally, a joint Timorese-international 
organisation, The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, reported that Australian aid to 
Timor-Leste during the transitional government from 1999 to 2002 alone 
was 89mUSD; of this amount only 7% was directly allocated to the 
education sector (The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)
141
. However, Australia 
has also donated 14% of its assistance to TFET (Trust Fund for East Timor), 
managed by the Wold Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The TFET 
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spends funds for projects in most sectors including 18% on education. The 
Lao Hamutuk Bulletin report suggested that Australian aid between 1999 
and 2002 to Timor-Leste’s education sector practically reached 21% of its 
total aid to Timor-Leste. Combining all the data to have been reported or yet 
to be reported on Australian aid to Timor-Leste, whether by the government 
of Timor-Leste or civil organisations, it is possible that Australian aid to 
Timor-Leste has been consequently great indeed, amounting to more than 
1bnUSD. The amount of assistance provided by Australia to Timor-Leste, 
for the size of a population currently just 1.1 million (General Directorate of 
Statistics, 2014)
142
, has perhaps affected the development of rapid change in 
general, and in particular the education sector. However, the current 
condition in Timor-Leste is actually reversed. The quality of education has 
still not improved much, and the people of Timor-Leste are still living 
below the poverty line. Riddell’s central interrogation, in his book Does 
Foreign Aid Really Work? (2007) should be addressed to Australian aid to 
Timor-Leste.  In other words, what has Australia been doing with the huge 
amount of money it has poured into the education sector in Timor-Leste, 
and what has been the government of Timor-Leste’s response? 
 
As a result, the Australian government reported that education in Timor-
Leste has been improved gradually in recent years (AusAID, 2012)
143
. 
However, the report has also recognised that the quality of education in 
Timor-Leste is still poor. The period of 1999 to 2002 was the period of 
emergency and transition for Timor-Leste. The transitional government of 
Timor-Leste had no power or authority to govern. All external and internal 
affairs of Timor-Leste were managed by the UNTAET. Yet, it was in this 
period that the leaders of Timor-Leste made the gladiatorial decision to 
adopt Portuguese as the official language, though the Timor-Leste 
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government only received its full independence from the UN on the 20
th
 of 
May 2002. In such circumstances it was difficult to track what the donors 
did and how and where the donors wanted to deliver their aid. Pires 
(2014)
144
 acknowledged that donor countries provided aid as they wished, 
determining to whom aid should be delivered and the purpose of the aid. 
From the beginning Australia has mainly focused its aid on humanitarian 
and security sectors. However, the Australians considered the education 
sector to be an important target for aid in order to gain trust from the 
Timorese leaders like the Portuguese did. Thus, it had directly contributed 
7% of its total aid to education during the emergency period. Australian 
educational aid has focused initially on primary schooling including 
constructing and rehabilitating school buildings, technical and vocational 
education training, and a small number of scholarship awards. Australian 
aid has also supported the government of Timor-Leste through rebuilding 
and rehabilitating some 2100 classrooms from 2008. These classrooms 
allow more children to go to school and learn in better and safer conditions. 
In addition to helping Timorese students to learn better – especially in 
reading skills – Australia, through its educational aid, supported the delivery 
of almost 1.4 million school materials to primary schools across Timor-
Leste. These materials include 94,500 books in Tetum to each primary 
school; and student and teacher resources such as worksheets, magazines 
and other school books. Hence, from the period 2007 to 2011 alone, the 
Australian government claimed to have contributed to the enrolment of 
nearly 35,000 additional children into primary schools across Timor-Leste, 
an increase of 17% (Australian Government-DFAT, 2014)
145
. These 
significant outcomes inspired the government of Australia to continue its 
support of the education sector of Timor-Leste. In 2015 for example, 
Australia has set its educational aid focus to several priority areas such as 
skills development training and higher education, with the expectation that 
more Timorese will improve their job opportunities. These projects will 
increase the skills of vocational training specialists, and support mobile 
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training units to reach rural areas. Australia will continue to provide teacher 
training and textbooks, and build more classrooms. The Australia 
Scholarship Awards will also continue to provide up to 35 Timorese 
recipients in 2015 with the opportunity to study at universities in Australia.  
 
Tertiary Education and Vocational Training  
 
Apart from aiding basic schools in Timor-Leste, Australia recently 
expanded its educational aid to include vocational education training and 
tertiary schooling. Australia felt Portugal has helped a lot on basic education 
in Timor-Leste, hence, Australia slightly shifted its aid to vocational 
training and to the provision of more scholarship awards. Australia has also 
been spending lots of money for vocational training in providing skills to 
Timorese government officials as well as preparing the Timorese youths 
with technical and job skills. Australian aid, administered by DFAT and 
channelled by the Australian Embassy in Timor-Leste, has widened to 
advance and increase English usage in Timor-Leste. In collaboration with 
UNTL, DFAT has established an English Studies Department, in order to 
assist university students to master English. Moreover, in 2012, 13 top 
Australian universities agreed to sign an important ‘scope document’ with 
the government of Timor-Leste to engage in Timor-Leste. These 
universities are involved in teaching and learning, research, academic 
capacity building or professional commercial development in Timor-Leste 
(Universities Australia, 2012)
146
. Besides providing support to the national 
university, Australia has offered Scholarship Awards to Timorese since 
2002. The Awards provide scholarships for not only Timorese students, but 
also researchers and professionals, to study in universities across Australia. 
The scholarship offered from 10 to 15 awards from 2002 to 2009 and from 
25 to 35 awards from 2010. The result has been that hundreds of graduate 
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and postgraduate scholars have returned home. A few hold senior 
government member positions including as Ministers in the previous and 
current governments (Australian Government-DFAT, 2013)
147
. The increase 
of scholarship awards shows the intention to train scholars who can then 
contribute to development in Timor-Leste, including the possibility of 
changing the language policy. Australia invested its educational aid in 
Timorese students along the lines expressed by Macalister (2012)
148
 that 
these scholars could one day emerge as the new leaders of Timor-Leste. 
These new leaders could be the agents of change of the language policy in 
Timor-Leste. Also, because they have studied at and graduated from 
universities in Australia, and been taught in English only, English could 
become a more dominant language in Timor-Leste.   
 
Language Competition 
 
In various ways Australia can influence the expansion of the use of the 
English language, not only among the Timorese public but also among the 
elites. Somewhat similar to the Portuguese school, the Australians have 
established an International school in Dili known as Dili International 
School (DIS). Throughout an interview, the current head of school, Custis 
Beaverford (a Canadian national), stated that the Australian government did 
not directly fund the DIS, and that DIS is 100% a private school, reliant on 
the tuition fees from students (Beaverford, 2014)
149
. In reality, the founders, 
the curriculum, the learning process and the teachers are almost entirely 
from Australia (DIS, 2014)
150
. DIS offers an international standard 
Preschool, and Primary and Secondary education programmes, all delivered 
in English. Its curriculum is entirely adopted from the Australian 
curriculum. In 2013 for example, DIS internationally accredited by the 
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Victorian government of Melbourne, Australia, to offer high school 
certificates of education. It gives the school an internationally recognised 
high school leaving certificate. DIS was established by Australian 
volunteers who, early on, worked in Timor-Leste to accommodate the needs 
of the expatriate community in the immediate post-referendum development 
period. However, times have changed and now DIS has also opened to the 
public. Like the Portuguese school, the tuition fees at DIS are also too 
expensive for most Timorese. Therefore, DIS is also considered as one of 
the elite schools in Timor-Leste. It is mostly a school for government 
officials’ children and the children of business people. Currently 85% of its 
registered students are from overseas and 15% only are from Timor-Leste. 
Although DIS was established in 2003, the government of Timor-Leste only 
recognised the school in 2006. The government of Timor-Leste, through the 
MoE, admitted that it had not established proper regulations to legalise the 
existence of international schools in Timor-Leste including DIS and the 
Portuguese School of Dili, Escola Portuguesa Ruy Cinatti Timor-Leste. 
Thus, the government of Timor-Leste has not gathered any data or 
information on DIS. The current Timor-Leste Prime Minister has three 
children enrolled at DIS, and some other Ministers, as well as government 
officials, also have children enrolled (Beaverford, 2014)
151
.  
 
Assessing Australian Aid 
 
Dolven, Margesson, & Vaughn (2012)
152
 claim that Australian foreign aid 
cannot be underestimated. Australia’s political and financial contribution to 
Timor-Leste has played an important part in maintaining the livelihoods of 
many Timorese and most importantly has contributed to the country’s 
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journey to gaining independence. Dolven, Margesson, & Vaughn (2012)
153
 
further claimed that the 2006 Australian assistance in the form of police and 
military contingents to secure law and order during the conflict in Timor-
Leste was a significant contribution by the Australian government. The 
Australian government argued that its investment contributed to the 
development progress of Timor-Leste. Such investments include facilitating 
thousands of farmers in improving their agricultural farming methods. Other 
results include helping nearly a hundred thousand of people access clean 
water and sanitation. In addition, AusAID also provides health care clinics 
around the country especially in the rural communities.  
 
The result of Australian educational aid as officially reported by the 
Australian government has been very impressive. However, various reports 
and research publicising conditions in Timor-Leste underline that the 
quality of education has continued to be poor. Pires (2014)
154
, recognised 
that the previous government had a very tough time in dealing with donor 
aid providers including Australia. In the early years of independence, 
Timor-Leste did not have enough human resources capacity to control the 
Australian aid that had flown into the country, and especially the aid 
donated to education. Prior to 2010, the government of Timor-Leste still 
found it difficult to control and collect data on Australian aid to education, 
due to the fact that Australia had delivered its assistance directly to the field 
without consulting the central/ national government. Australia had often 
built schools in districts or sub-districts in Timor-Leste without informing 
central government. The government through MoE only became aware of 
Australia’s activities after the project had been completed. Many primary 
schools in Timor-Leste have signs saying that the school is funded by 
AusAID with a big Kangaroo image on it. The government of Timor-Leste, 
says Pires, started to control donor aid providers including Australia and 
Portugal between 2008 and 2009. However, it was only in 2010 that the 
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MoE established a policy to control all donors for the education sector. All 
donors’ programmes to education need to act in accordance with three main 
conditions set by the Ministry: first, Timor-Leste’s Strategic Development 
Plan (SDP); second, Timor-Leste’s national priority for a five year term; 
and third, MoE policy. An example of the implementation of the Ministry’s 
policy towards Australia could be seen in 2013, when it decided to revoke a 
contract with Australia due to a technical problem on Australia’s part. In 
addition, AusAID has a complicated and sophisticated bureaucracy which 
makes it harder for Timor-Leste to access information related to the aid it 
receives. Pires (2014)
155
, as the representative of the government of Timor-
Leste, admitted that, in terms of financial support, Australia has been the 
largest supporter of the education sector in Timor-Leste. He
156
 also admitted 
that the previous government relied too much on education aid from donors 
such as Australia. However, the current government has a strong 
commitment to not depending too much on donors. Hence, the MoE’s 
policy has also clearly stated that all donors need to obey and respect 
Timor-Leste sovereignty.  
 
Foreign aid, as Lancaster (2007)
157
 proposed, is “the gift of public resources 
from one government to another (or to an international organisation or 
nongovernmental organisation), sizable and sustained over time, an 
important purpose of which was to help improve the human condition in the 
countries receiving the aid” (p.1). In other words, it is meant to save lives 
and contribute to development, growth, and poverty reduction in poor 
countries (Riddell, 2007)
158
. Australia’s foreign aid to Timor-Leste raises 
concerns amongst Australians and Timorese. Some people believed that the 
money used by the Australian government in assisting the government of 
Timor-Leste was the same money taken from the exploration of the Timor-
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Gap. The Timor-Gap, also known as the Timor-Sea, is an oil-rich resource 
located at the maritime boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia, which 
is legally owned by Timor-Leste. However, it was exploited by Australia 
before Timor-Leste gained independence, when it was still under Indonesian 
occupation. Donor countries have implemented their aid programmes in 
such a way that they maximise economic benefits for their own states and 
citizens. Anderson (2010)
159, an Australian scholar, argued that Australia’s 
assistance to Timor-Leste was seen as exploitative rather than supportive. 
He argued that the development funds provided by Australia to date have 
not benefited the people of Timor-Leste. For example, very little education 
and training happens under AusAID programmes, even though billions of 
dollars are spent. Anderson (2010)
160
 claimed that Australia is acting “as a 
neo-colonialist, attempting to dominate the development of a client state” 
(p.1). In Dili
161
, for example, highly paid AusAID consultants from 
Australia wire the majority of their salaries home. Procurement is still 
undertaken in Australia rather than buying local products in Timor-Leste to 
help the economy (The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)
162
. Furthermore, 
former Timor-Leste President, Jose Ramos-Horta, commented that 
“Australian foreign aid has been all over the places and did not transform 
the lives of the people” (Kelly & AAP, 2010. p.1)163. Warden (2009. p.2)164 
reported that claims of Australian aid inefficiency were also recognised by 
the then-former Australian Prime Minister – Kevin Rudd – who took office 
from 2007 to 2010 and again in 2013, in his interview on ABC Radio 
Australia during his tenure. The former Prime Minister acknowledged “too 
much Australian aid was being spent on consultants’ fees”.   
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Conclusion 
 
Australia claimed that its bilateral and multilateral aid are given solely for 
humanitarian and development reasons. However, recent literature reveals 
that donor governments including Australia usually have political and 
economic goals when supplying assistance. These goals may include 
increasing regional stability or influencing the policies of the recipient 
government and the nation’s civil society. Bilateral aid is often “tied,” 
meaning that the donor government puts conditions on the aid, requiring 
that the funds are used to buy products or services (such as expensive 
consultants) from the donor country. In this way, the economy of the donor 
country also benefits, which is strongly against the belief enshrined in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to build on more effective and 
inclusive partnerships between recipients and donors. 
 
Numerous organisations and individuals criticised Australian foreign aid to 
Timor-Leste for how it is coupled with political and economic interest. The 
Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2009)
165
 for example, criticised Australian aid to 
Timor-Leste for straying far away from its principals, economically 
benefitting its own state and citizens as a prime motivation and result. The 
Lao Hamutuk Bulletin earlier commented that Australia helped Timor-Leste 
because of its interests in Timor-Leste’s oil field resources. Australia 
insisted on control over land owned oil of Timor-Leste even before Timor-
Leste’s independence, despite the fact that Australia’s distance to the oil 
field is not comparable to Timor-Leste’s. Prior to the current situation, The 
Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2002)
166
 has argued that Australia’s foreign aid to 
Timor-Leste has not been comparable to what Australia took from Timor-
Leste’s oil-wealth resource. Moreover, Anderson (2010)167 , claimed that 
development funds provided by Australia and other major donor countries 
to date have not benefited the people of Timor-Leste. Australian aid, it is 
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claimed, is really evidence of an interest in the political and economical 
situation of Timor-Leste. Foreign aid is supposed to be a gift, as Lancaster 
(2007)
168
 pointed out, given to improve the human condition in the 
receiving country. However, while bilateral aid from donor countries 
continues to be critical for Timor-Leste, such aid is not always what it 
claims to be. On the other hand, Australia claimed that its military 
assistance to Timor-Leste in 1999 and 2006 could not be compared to the 
current agreement on the spilt over resources in the Timor Sea (ETAN, 
2005)
169
. Aid from Australia, while helping to develop and rebuild Timor-
Leste, costs Timor-Leste’s ability to effectively claim and assert its 
sovereignty in the disputed territory.  
 
From the beginning Australia and Portugal have been the two largest aid 
providers to Timor-Leste. Australia has demonstrated its intention to help 
Timor-Leste, despite its political and economical interests. Australia’s 
educational aid, therefore, is perhaps a useful counterweight to Portuguese 
educational aid in Timor-Leste. Australia appears to have been in 
competition with Portugal in providing educational aid to Timor-Leste. For 
instance, Australian educational aid has primarily focused on basic 
schooling including building and rehabilitating school buildings, and 
technical and vocational educations. However, in recent years Australia has 
seen Portugal’s expansion in educational support to Timor-Leste’s tertiary 
studies (the establishing of Portuguese studies departments at UNTL) as a 
challenge for Australia to also increase and expand its levels of educational 
aid to tertiary studies. Along the same lines as Portugal, Australia has set up 
the English studies department at the UNTL as an additional avenue by 
which to increase English ability in Timor-Leste. 
 
Competitive practices between Australian and Portuguese interests have 
made significant changes to the educational system in Timor-Leste. Both of 
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these countries have different cultural, historical, and political links and 
models to and with Timor-Leste, which makes it difficult to predict the end 
result of their efforts. In addition, Australia has poorly coordinated, indeed, 
an absence of, agreed education development plans with the government of 
Timor-Leste. Recent literature on development assistance has suggested that 
at times aid can actually be detrimental to a country’s growth if it is not 
given for the right reasons or invested in the right places, potentially causing 
growth to stagnate and giving rise to divisions within a country. While 
Timor-Leste must be wary of this, the competitive nature of its largest 
donors has even further implications for the country.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion 
 
Timor-Leste is a relatively young country which gained its independence in 
May 2002. After the mass destruction and widespread murder which 
occurred in 1999, the Timorese decided to free themselves from the 
Indonesian occupation which had also virtually destroyed an already weak 
education system. When law and order were restored in late 1999, the UN 
and the new transitional government of Timor-Leste struggled to build an 
education system to meet the country's expected needs. During the 
transitional period, Timor-Leste was governed by the UN. The departure of 
Indonesians impacted on both administrative and economic infrastructure, 
and the displacement of people included the few involved in the 
administration during Indonesian’s rule. There was no real Timorese 
structure to form a government capable of governing a nation state. At this 
time, Timor-Leste had only limited resources with which to develop the 
nation from ruin. Therefore, Timor-Leste’s post-independence was an 
extremely difficult period for the country’s leaders. Apart from limited 
resources, the country was also weak in its political institutions. Hence, 
Timor-Leste was in urgent need of sources to fund the whole country’s 
development. This condition helps explain Portugal and Australia’s decision 
to help alleviate the suffering of the population of Timor-Leste through 
humanitarian and development assistance. Eventually, Timor-Leste received 
relatively high levels of foreign development aid from Australia and 
Portugal, especially to the education sector.  
 
Timor-Leste, however, was in a weak position to determine and control the 
foreign aid that flowed into the state, due to the fact that as a newly 
independent state it had no experience and limited resources. While the 
country needs both money and allies to survive, complicating these needs, 
Portugal and Australia have quite different historical relationships with 
Timor-Leste. Australia and Portugal, both want to be involved and offering 
money and technical assistance to Timor-Leste.  
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Portugal, on the one hand, has been providing aid to Timor-Leste primarily 
driven by its political interest. The impact of the relationship between 
Timor-Leste and Portugal’s educational aid is that Timor-Leste ended up 
choosing Portuguese as one of its official languages. In addition, Portugal 
has a great source of cash, thus directly affecting Timor-Leste’s power 
relations and dependency to Portugal. Portuguese power comes from Timor-
Leste being a weak state that needs allies. Portugal can be an ally and 
Timor-Leste has to be nice to the Portuguese in order to get access to 
Portugal’s aid. These conditions add to the difficulty of the choices that 
Timor-Leste has to make. Worse, it was not clear that the first elected 
Timor-Leste government could even make those choices, because the 
Portuguese got in to Timor-Leste immediately after Timor-Leste decided to 
separate itself from the Indonesian occupation.  
 
The historical ties with Timor-Leste was only a mask behind which both 
Portuguese and a few Timorese elites reinforced Portuguese policy in 
Timor-Leste’s education system. In 2002 Portuguese was adopted as one of 
Timor-Leste’s official languages, stipulated in the country’s constitution. 
Portuguese aid primarily focused on the education sector. Specifically the 
support it offered sought to promote the Portuguese language, following 
Timor-Leste’s decision to include Portuguese in its official languages. 
Portugal’s educational aid to Timor-Leste has been prioritised in primary, 
secondary and tertiary education. Consequently, hundreds of primary school 
buildings were built and thousands of unqualified Timorese primary school 
teachers were trained as Portuguese teachers. Furthermore, the only 
language of instruction at primary schools from years one to nine is 
Portuguese, while all documents in government public services are written 
and documented in Portuguese. Additionally, to strengthen the foundation 
of Portuguese expansion in Timor-Leste, Portugal also established a 
Portuguese school in the capital city of Dili. Portuguese foreign policy to 
Timor-Leste was reinforced by the first government and national 
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parliament, the majority of whom were Timorese leaders who had lived in 
exile during the Indonesian occupation. These leaders had lived in 
Portuguese-speaking countries such as Portugal, Mozambique, and Angola. 
They were convinced that the choice of Portuguese as one of Timor-Leste’s 
official languages would safeguard Timorese culture and identity, as well as 
maintain its connections with Portugal as the former colonial master. It was 
also intended to maintain privileged ties and friendships with others among 
the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries. However, the decision 
to officially adopt Portuguese has most concretely benefitted a few 
Timorese political elites. More importantly, the political interest of Portugal 
has been embedded as an influence in the policy-making of Timor-Leste. As 
a result, the Portuguese language is used throughout all institutions and 
public services of Timor-Leste. In short, Portugal has sought to 
“Lusophonize”170 all Timorese, an effort which had failed during 450 years 
of colonization over Timor-Leste. It could be argued that Portugal pursued 
the domination of Timor-Leste for a second time by using its educational 
aid to push the use of the Portuguese language through the entire country. 
Portugal’s foreign policy to Timor-Leste could be seen as a form of neo-
colonialism. Portugal, who had both money and the appearance of a close 
friend of Timor-Leste, have used these to convince Timorese leaders to 
reform its language policy.  
 
On the other hand, Australia has been offering its educational aid to Timor-
Leste because of its political and economic interest. Australia has spent a lot 
of money in Timor-Leste to buy friendship. It is inevitable that Australia’s 
foreign aid has positively contributed to the human resources development 
of Timor-Leste, particularly helping to educate many Timorese overseas. 
For example, some alumnus, having graduated from Australia’s universities, 
hold positions as Ministers or members of government. Others hold 
positions in national and international NGOs. Development assistance 
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provided by Australia and other major donor countries should have helped 
decrease poverty and improve the quality of education in Timor-Leste. The 
opposite however is happening, Australia’s foreign aid is tied to its great 
interest in politics and economics. Therefore, Australian foreign aid in 
Timor-Leste is seen by many as suspicious. An obvious problem relates to 
the ownership of the oil field; the relationship between Timor-Leste and 
Australia has unpleasant aspects to do with the maritime frontier and is 
experiencing tough and highly tense negotiations. Yet despite almost one 
and half decade of efforts, the dispute remains unresolved. The Timor Gap 
is an oil-rich resource, which is legally owned by Timor-Leste. However, it 
has been exploited by Australia even before Timor-Leste gained 
independence from Indonesian occupation. It can be argued that bilateral aid 
from Australia to Timor-Leste is perhaps open to criticism and controversy, 
and that such aid is not always what it claims to be. The aid assistance is 
nevertheless given to help Timor-Leste, but solely because of Australia’s 
economic interest in Timor-Leste’s oil fields. Perhaps the billions of dollars 
of funds are from the oil revenue taken from the Timor Gap. Evidently, 
while Australia’s aid to Timor-Leste has been supplied for over a decade 
and more than one billion dollars have been spent, Timorese are still living 
below the poverty line and the quality of education continues to be as poor 
as it was previously. 
 
Educational aid provided by both Australia and Portugal greatly influenced 
Timor-Leste’s education policy. Timor-Leste’s basic school curriculum, for 
example, is entirely copied from the Portuguese system, while curriculum 
designers and educator experts are funded by Australia. Hence, the 
education sector of Timor-Leste seems, at this time, dependent on foreign 
aid from Australia and Portugal. The MoF confessed that Timor-Leste, on 
average, has received ODA of 200mUSD per annum. The continuation of 
poor quality education in Timor-Leste is believed to be due to a lack of 
coordination between donors including Australia and Portugal, who have no 
agreed education development plan between themselves and the government 
of Timor-Leste. Australia and Portugal delivered their educational aid 
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directly to local communities without consulting with the central 
government of Timor-Leste. This resulted in many primary school teachers 
receiving different instructions from different instructors provided by 
donors. The consequence is that the majority of primary school teachers are 
unqualified, thus feeding into the poor quality of the education system. 
Australia and Portugal, as developed countries, have portrayed their 
engagement in Timor-Leste as a benevolent or humanitarian engagement 
when in fact most of what is counted as ODA goes to nationals of those 
countries, wired back home to banks, as with the high salaries of 
international consultants from Australia or the hundreds of expensive 
Portuguese teachers sent from Portugal to Timor-Leste.  
 
Timor-Leste needs to build everything from scratch, with no experience 
managing its foreign aid, including the establishment of political 
institutions. Although it is a sovereign nation, Timor-Leste has limited 
capability to persuade Australia and Portugal to negotiate fairly in 
complying with the country’s necessities. For example, during the 
emergency or transitional period, Portugal and Australia delivered their 
educational assistance based on their wishes. Portugal, for instance, was 
busy training primary school teachers to be able to teach Portuguese as a 
move towards the adoption of Portuguese and some classroom renovations. 
Australia, on the other hand, focused its educational aid on repairing 
primary school classrooms and buildings, and providing school materials as 
well as offering scholarships for Timorese students to study at Australian 
universities. Both Portugal and Australia were already in competition in 
delivering their educational aid to Timor-Leste and yet failing to fulfil 
essential Timorese education policy needs. The Portuguese School, Escola 
Rui Cinnaty Dili, and the Australian establishment school, DIS, both 
established in 2003, were only recognised by the government in 2006. In 
short, I argue that educational aid always has political force and that it is 
therefore difficult for the recipient government to negotiate when donors are 
trying to achieve their own goals.  
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Potential Ways Forward  
 
Is there anything Timor-Leste could do to gain more control? 
 
It took a decade for the government of Timor-Leste to manage and control 
donor activities in the education sector. Prior to 2010, Portugal and 
Australia were directly offering their educational aid to the local community 
without central government knowledge. In other words, the government of 
Timor-Leste had no control over donors’ activities and expenditures. It was 
only in 2008 that the government, through the MoE, began to coordinate 
with all donor providers to the education sector of Timor-Leste. The 
government of Timor-Leste has undertaken a number of efforts to control 
and cut down the country’s dependence on foreign educational assistance. 
These efforts include the first Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030. This 
plan sets a framework to transform Timor-Leste from a low income country 
to a medium-high income country by 2030, when every Timorese person 
will have the opportunity to be educated and secured. The SDP 2011-2030 
is the overarching framework for the Development Partners project and 
programmes design and implementation and re-affirms the alignment of 
their work with Timor-Leste’s strategy plans and targets. The government 
of Timor-Leste and the DPs, with the private sector, are committed to 
working through the development policy coordination mechanism to drive 
planning and delivery of the all programmes.  
 
The second effort is to use the government of Timor-Leste’s National 
Priority (NP). The NP defines critical goals and measures progress toward 
those through an agreed set of monitorable benchmarks and actions outlined 
in the target year. Hence, DPs are required to adjust their programmes to 
those already outlined by the government. The third action used to manage 
DPs is the Internal Policy of the MoE. In 2010, the MoE of Timor-Leste 
issued a policy to control all donor providers to the education sector. All 
donor providers, including Portugal and Australia, need to consult at the 
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early stage and obtain approval from the MoE before the project begins. The 
MoE has also established a roundtable donor meeting as a coordination 
mechanism. Alternatively, Timor-Leste currently hires national advisors 
who have graduated oversees as well as those to have graduated in the 
country, in order to decrease the country’s dependence on international 
advisors.  
 
Through these efforts, the current government believed that it could 
effectively control entirely donor providers to the education sector in Timor-
Leste including donors’ activities and funding. Timor-Leste has established 
a forum called the Timor-Leste Development Partner Meeting (TLDPM). 
This is a forum that brings all donor partners in Timor-Leste and the 
government together to discuss donor performances in Timor-Leste. The 
TLDPM draws strongly upon the belief enshrined in the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness. The TLDPM aims to build more effective and 
inclusive partnerships between government and development partners. The 
government supposed that the result of the TLDPM would have a greater 
impact on reducing poverty and ensure a more positive future for the people 
of Timor-Leste. Since December 2002, the TLDPM has sought to highlight 
the significance of forging development partnerships among bilateral and 
multilateral donors and other key development stakeholders, including civil 
society operating in Timor-Leste. However, numerous findings and research 
published show that the international educational aid to Timor-Leste failed 
due to lack of coordination amongst donors, government and civil societies, 
(Shah, 2012 & Pires, 2014, Simoes, 2014
171
, Wong, 2014
172
). In addition, 
even though the TLDPM has been held for 14 years since Timor-Leste 
gained its independence, the debate during the TLDPM in 2014 has still 
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focused on the poor coordination between international donor partners and 
the government. Despite the fact that donors have spent billions of dollars in 
Timor-Leste, Timor-Leste civil societies and some members of government 
remain concerned that donor partners have often delivered their assistance 
based on the interests of the donor, rather than being purely development 
driven. The country did not have a long term development framework in 
which DPs could operate providing them an opportunity to do what suited 
them, whether or not influenced by their foreign policy. 
 
Does Timor-Leste have enough money from its oil and gas revenue to 
fund its education?  
 
Timor-Leste in fact is an oil-rich country and its main economic hope for 
the future lies in massive reserves of oil and gas in the Timor Sea or Timor 
Gap. The oil resources, it is believed, could generate billions of dollars that 
could in turn be directed into the nation’s economic engine. Timor-Leste 
could use its oil resource revenues as a form of capital that directly 
contributes to the country’s education development. However, the country 
still lacks in human resources in managing and planning. Poverty and the 
poor quality of education mean that the country remains at third world 
standards, and very little has been done over the three terms of the 
government of Timor-Leste to ease the difficulties of the Timorese people. 
Many oil fields have been found in Timor-Leste’s exclusive maritime 
territory since independence. However, these oil fields are explored by 
several foreign companies, mostly from Australia. After gaining 
independence, Timor-Leste has been prioritizing the exploration of oil and 
gas located in the Timor Sea as a top priority. Nevertheless, having gained 
independence, the country has little capacity to govern its institutions, let 
alone manage a billion dollar oil industry. Also, the country lacks technical 
expertise and capacity in important government institutions to make those 
institutions work and become effective. Therefore the government still need 
experts from elsewhere. Consequently, many international agencies and 
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advisors, mostly from Australia and Portugal, have been requested to assist 
Timorese in education development. In fact, Timor-Leste has very few 
experienced managers and public officials. Therefore, elite politicians take 
up multiple roles in the government. This triggers potential internal conflicts 
among Timorese policy makers, causing them to stand on the opposing side 
and be reluctant to argue against donors such as the Australians and the 
Portuguese. International advisors have greatly influenced Timor-Leste 
since its independence until today. Timor-Leste has hired an enormous 
amount of international advisors to act as mentors throughout the whole 
government. These advisors are mostly from Australia and Portugal and 
believed to heavily influence the government’s decision-making, especially 
in the education sector. In deploying such power, powerful states such as 
Australia and Portugal use a variety of tactics to inhibit the ability of a 
relatively weak state like Timor-Leste to challenge their status quo. The 
result is that Australia and Portugal have been using their human resources 
superiority and their developed technology to suppress Timor-Leste.  
 
Freedom for Timor-Leste means it has brought a new language but not 
prosperity. Timor-Leste is still one of the poorest countries in the region 
including in terms of its education. It imports nearly all basic goods from 
abroad including its all its education system from Portugal. Although the 
country has been independent for one and half decades, the real freedom is 
still far away. Timor-Leste’s education system still depends upon Australia 
and Portugal for survival. But if the gas and oil are managed properly, the 
Timorese people should have a very different future with good quality 
education at the heart of the effort to manage themselves. 
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